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THE JURISPRUDENCE OF DIGNITY 
LESLIE MELTZER HENRY†
Few words play a more central role in modern constitutional law without 
appearing in the Constitution than “dignity.”  The term appears in more than 
nine hundred Supreme Court opinions, but despite its popularity, dignity is a 
concept in disarray.  Its meanings and functions are commonly presupposed 
but rarely articulated.  The result is a cacophony of uses so confusing that some 
critics argue the word ought to be abandoned altogether. 
 
This Article fills a void in the literature by offering the first empirical study 
of Supreme Court opinions that invoke dignity and then proposing a typology 
of dignity based on an analysis of how the term is used in those opinions.  The 
study reveals three important findings.  First, the Court’s reliance on dignity is 
increasing, and the Roberts Court is accelerating that trend.  Second, in con-
trast to its past use, dignity is now as likely to be invoked by the more conserva-
tive Justices on the Court as by their more liberal counterparts.  Finally, the 
study demonstrates that dignity is not one concept, as other scholars have theo-
rized, but rather five related concepts. 
The typology refers to these conceptions of dignity as institutional status as 
dignity, equality as dignity, liberty as dignity, personal integrity as dig-
nity, and collective virtue as dignity.  This Article traces each type of dignity 
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to its epistemic origins and describes the substantive dignitary interests each pro-
tects.  Importantly, the typology offers more than a clarification of the conceptual 
chaos surrounding dignity.  It provides tools to track the Court’s use of different 
types of dignity over time.  This permits us to detect doctrinally transformative 
moments, in such areas as state sovereign immunity and abortion jurisprudence, 
that arise from shifting conceptions of dignity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., frequently emphasized that the 
fundamental value at the crux of American law is “the constitutional 
ideal of human dignity.”1  He believed that the Constitution, and par-
ticularly the Bill of Rights, expressed a “bold commitment by a people 
to the ideal of dignity protected through law.”2  Perhaps to give doc-
trinal heft to a word that appears nowhere in the Constitution, Justice 
Brennan invoked “dignity” in an astounding thirty-nine opinions dur-
ing his tenure on the Court.3  Despite the breadth of cases to which he 
applied the term,4 Brennan’s tireless efforts to advance a legal notion 
of dignity often were discounted either because the term appeared in 
his dissenting opinions,5 or because when dignity appeared in the ma-
jority opinions Brennan authored, his opinions represented the “lib-
eral wing” of the Court’s jurisprudence.6
After a brief period of hibernation during the Burger and Rehn-
quist Courts, the use of dignity is once again on the rise.  The Roberts 
Court has issued opinions that invoke dignity in thirty-four cases,
 
7 
nearly half of those in the last two Terms alone.8
 
1
Bernard Schwartz, How Justice Brennan Changed America, in REASON AND PASSION:  
JUSTICE BRENNAN’S ENDURING INFLUENCE 31, 41 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard 
Schwartz eds., 1997); see also In Search of the Constitution:  Mr. Justice Brennan (PBS televi-
sion broadcast Apr. 16, 1987) (interview by Bill Moyers) (highlighting in an interview 
with Justice Brennan the importance of human dignity in constitutional jurisprudence). 
  We would be mista-
2
William J. Brennan, Jr., My Life on the Court, in REASON AND PASSION, supra note 
1, at 17, 18. 
3
For a list of these opinions, see infra Appendix Tables 1a-1c.  Several footnotes 
throughout this Article refer the reader to the Appendix, which includes tables listing 
cases.  These cases have been culled from the Supreme Court Dignity Database, a da-
tabase I created that includes all Supreme Court opinions invoking the word “dignity.”  
After analyzing the use of dignity in each opinion, I created the typology and catego-
rized the various uses accordingly.  For each use of dignity, the database also tracks the 
Justice invoking the term; whether the opinion is a majority, dissent, or concurrence; 
the subject matter of the case; and the Court’s final vote. 
4
See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 625 (1984) (finding that sex dis-
crimination “deprives persons of their individual dignity”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 
254, 264-65 (1970) (explaining that “from its founding” the United States has at-
tempted “to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within its borders,” particu-
larly the poor); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (noting that the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment “is to protect personal privacy and dignity”). 
5
Fewer than one-third of Justice Brennan’s invocations of dignity appear in ma-
jority opinions.  See infra Appendix Table 1a. 
6
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 31. 
7
For a list of these cases, see infra Appendix Table 2. 
8
In the 2009 and 2010 Terms, Justices on the Court invoked dignity in sixteen 
cases.  See id.   
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ken, however, to see this as a reascendance of Justice Brennan’s “dig-
nity.”  To the contrary, dignity is now more likely to appear in majority 
than in dissenting opinions,9 and as likely to be invoked by Justice Sca-
lia as by Justice Ginsburg.10
Dignity’s increasing popularity,
 
11 however, does not signal agree-
ment about what the term means.  Instead, its importance, meaning, 
and function are commonly presupposed but rarely articulated.  As a 
result, contrasting views about dignity’s definition, usefulness, and ul-
timate purpose have emerged.12
For some commentators, dignity is nothing less than “the premier 
value underlying the last two centuries of moral and political 
thought,”
 
13 an essential “basis of human rights,”14 and one of “those 
very great political values that define our constitutional morality.”15  
Like Justice Brennan, legal theorist Ronald Dworkin has declared that 
“the principles of human dignity . . . are embodied in the Constitution 
and are now common ground in America.”16
Indeed, few concepts dominate modern constitutional jurispru-





Compare infra Figure 2 (showing that roughly three percent of dissenting opi-
nions currently invoke dignity), with infra Figure 3 (demonstrating that nearly four 
percent of majority opinions currently invoke dignity).  
  
The Supreme Court has invoked the term in connection with the 
10
Since Justice Ginsburg joined the Court in 1993, she and Justice Scalia have 
each authored eleven opinions that invoke dignity.  
11
See infra Figure 1.  
12
See, e.g., Leslie A. Meltzer, Book Review, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 660, 660-61 
(2008) (reviewing HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS:  ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE 
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS (2008)) (critiquing a collection of essays on dig-
nity and calling for a less ideologically driven approach to defining dignity).  
13
Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, 
in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:  HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 145, 145 
(Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992). 
14
Alan Gewirth, Human Dignity as the Basis of Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 10, 28. 
15
William A. Parent, Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITU-
TION OF RIGHTS, supra note 13, at 47, 71. 
16
Ronald Dworkin, Three Questions for America, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Sept. 21, 2006, at 
24, 26; see also RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 191-218, 255-75 (2011) 
(exploring the meaning of dignity).  
17
The Court invokes privacy frequently, but unlike its use of dignity, the Court has 
determined that the Constitution affirmatively protects a right of privacy.  See, e.g., 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding a right to marital priva-
cy).  Moreover, the privacy right established in Griswold has been extended by numer-
ous Supreme Court cases, including Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), wherein the 
Court held that the right to privacy encompassed the right to an abortion.  
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First,18 Fourth,19 Fifth,20 Sixth,21 Eighth,22 Ninth,23 Eleventh,24 Four-
teenth,25 and Fifteenth Amendments.26
 
18
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (“The constitutional right 
of free expression . . . is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints 
from the arena of public discussion . . . in the belief that no other approach would 
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political 
system rests.”); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Vic-
tims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116, 123 (1991) (holding a “Son of Sam” law unconstitutional 
as burdening speech based on subject matter and quoting Cohen to show that govern-
mental restraint of free speech in the political arena is incompatible with individual 
dignity); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991) (quoting Cohen for the 
proposition that dignity is at the root of First Amendment protections); cf. Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757-58 (1985) (weighing 
First Amendment expression against the “essential dignity” of all persons to protect 
their reputation (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974))).  
 
19
See, e.g., Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (explaining that one 
purpose of the knock-and-announce rule is to protect “dignity that can be destroyed by 
a sudden entrance”); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 613-14 (1989) 
(stating that the Fourth Amendment “guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of 
persons against certain arbitrary and invasive acts by officers of the Government”); 
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 766-67 (1985) (holding that a person cannot be 
compelled by the state to undergo surgery to remove a bullet linked to a crime because 
such an act would be an unwarranted intrusion on personal dignity); Rochin v. Cali-
fornia, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (overturning a drug conviction on the basis that the 
police’s decision to pump the defendant’s stomach against his will to acquire evidence 
was “offensive to human dignity”); cf. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 
152 (2004) (noting that “some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches 
of the person” is warranted due to “dignity and privacy interests,” whereas searches of 
vehicles do not prompt the same concerns). 
20
See, e.g., Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (finding that successive pros-
ecutions by two states do not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the defen-
dant violated the “‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns” in one act (quoting United 
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922))); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 
107 (1976) (requiring, under the Due Process Clause, that “aliens be treated with the 
same dignity and respect accorded to other persons”); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 460 (1966) (“[T]he constitutional foundation underlying the privilege [against 
self-incrimination] is the respect a government . . . must accord to the dignity and in-
tegrity of its citizens.”). 
21
See, e.g., Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“[A] right of self-
representation at trial will not ‘affirm the dignity’ of a defendant who lacks the mental 
capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of counsel.” (quoting McKaskle 
v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984))); McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 176-77 (“The right to 
appear pro se exists to affirm the dignity and autonomy of the accused . . . .”) (empha-
sis omitted)); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (affirming the right to ap-
pear pro se but stating that it “is not a license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom”). 
22
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419-20 (2008) (restricting the im-
position of capital punishment to a narrow range of cases based on “[e]volving stan-
dards of decency” that “express respect for the dignity of the person”); Roper v. Sim-
mons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (setting aside the death sentence of a juvenile under 
the age of eighteen and noting that “the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the duty of the 
government to respect the dignity of all persons”); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 
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Other scholars and jurists, however, view dignity as a concept in 
crisis.27
 
(2002) (finding that handcuffing a prisoner to a hitching post in the sun for seven 
hours violated the “basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment[, which] is noth-
ing less than the dignity of man” (alteration in original) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ford v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (plurality opinion) (prohibiting the execu-
tion of mentally ill persons and explaining that the Eighth Amendment “protect[s] the 
dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance”); Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 158, 173, 207 (1976) (plurality opinion) (upholding the death 
penalty of an individual convicted of murder but noting that the Eighth Amendment 
requires penalties to be in accord with “the dignity of man” (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 
100) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 285 
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (commenting that “the State may not inflict punish-
ments that do not comport with human dignity” under the Eighth Amendment). 
  Philosopher Ruth Macklin considers dignity “a useless con-
cept” because it does nothing more than offer “vague restatements 
23
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) (granting the “same 
dignity,” or status, to privacy as it had previously given to other “peripheral rights”).  
24
See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) 
(describing states as having “dignity that is consistent with their status as sovereign ent-
ities”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (recognizing that states “retain the 
dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty”). 
25
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567, 578-79 (2003) (overturning Tex-
as’s antisodomy statute on the ground that “adults may choose” to engage in same-sex 
relationships and still “retain their dignity as free persons”); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. 
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 129, 142 (1994) (ruling gender-based juror exclusion criteria un-
constitutional and asserting that the criteria “denigrate[] the dignity of the excluded 
juror”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality 
opinion) (characterizing “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, family relationships, child-rearing, and education” as “central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy”); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) 
(plurality opinion) (determining that a minority set-aside program implicates the right 
“to be treated with equal dignity and respect”); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetri-
cians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (“Few decisions are . . . more basic to 
individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision . . . whether to end her 
pregnancy.”); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264-65 (1970) (“From its founding the 
Nation’s basic commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons 
within its borders.”). 
26
See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (invalidating a Hawaiian race-
based voting statute because “it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be 
judged by ancestry”). 
27
For a review of the main criticisms of dignity, see Gerhold K. Becker, In Search of 
Humanity:  Human Dignity as a Basic Moral Attitude, in THE FUTURE OF VALUE INQUIRY 
53, 53 (Matti Häyry & Tuija Takala eds., 2001), which describes claims that dignity is an 
“empty formula without precise content,” a “rhetorical device,” and a “conversation 
stopper.”  Similar arguments have been leveled against the concept of equality.  See Pe-
ter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537, 547 (1982) (arguing that 
the rhetoric of equality should be abandoned because the principle of equality lacks 
content).      
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of . . . more precise . . . notions.”28  Law and ethics professor John Har-
ris echoes Macklin’s concern, pointing out that the word is “universally 
attractive” because it is “comprehensively vague.”29  Meanwhile, philo-
sopher Helga Kuhse contends that as long as dignity is invoked by 
people on opposite sides of a debate30 it is “nothing more than a short-
hand expression for people’s moral intuitions and feelings.”31
Despite deep disagreement about its normative, practical, and ju-
risprudential value, dignity’s growing presence in Supreme Court de-





Ruth Macklin, Dignity Is a Useless Concept, 327 BMJ 1419, 1419 (2003).  But see 
Suzy Killmister, Dignity:  Not Such a Useless Concept, 36 J. MED. ETHICS 160, 160 (2010) 
(challenging Macklin’s claim that dignity is “a useless concept” and arguing that digni-
ty can “serve as a guiding principle in medical ethics”). 
  The literature on dignity is pri-
29
John Harris, Cloning and Human Dignity, 7 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 
163, 163 (1998) (Eng.). 
30
For example, people on both sides of the debate about the morality and legality 
of physician-assisted suicide appeal to dignity.  Daniel P. Sulmasy, Dignity and Bioethics:  
History, Theory, and Selected Applications, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS:  ESSAYS 
COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS 469, 469 (2008).  Propo-
nents argue that individuals with prolonged suffering at the end of life experience a 
loss of dignity that warrants physician-assisted suicide.  See, e.g., Jyl Gentzler, What Is 
Death with Dignity?, 28 J. MED. & PHIL. 461, 461-80 (2003) (exploring the ways in which 
advocates of physician-assisted suicide invoke dignity).  By contrast, opponents con-
tend that the practice fails to properly respect the dignity of human life in every form.  
See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, Defending Human Dignity (explaining that those who reject physi-
cian-assisted suicide do so because “every still-living human being, regardless of condi-
tion” has dignity), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra at 297, 304-05. 
31
Helga Kuhse, Is There a Tension Between Autonomy and Dignity?, in 2 BIOETHICS 
AND BIOLAW 61, 72 (Peter Kemp et al. eds., 2000).  Echoing a similar sentiment, South 
African law professor and judge Dennis Davis has remarked that dignity is “a piece of 
jurisprudential Legoland—to be used in whatever form and shape is required by the 
demands of the judicial designer.”  D.M. Davis, Equality:  The Majesty of Legoland Juri-
sprudence, 116 S. AFR. L.J. 398, 413 (1999). 
32
Most scholarship on the Court’s use of dignity focuses on the doctrine of sove-
reign immunity.  See Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference:  The Supreme Court’s New 
Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 250-56, 265 (2000) (criticizing the Court’s use of 
dignity in justifying state sovereign immunity and arguing instead that the Court focus 
on practical liability concerns to defend the doctrine); Judith Resnik & Julie Chi-hye 
Suk, Adding Insult to Injury:  Questioning the Role of Dignity in Conceptions of Sovereignty, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1921, 1934-54, 1960-63 (2003) (discussing how dignity has increasingly 
been used in reference to personal dignity and how this trend challenges the use of 
institutional dignity to support state sovereignty); Peter J. Smith, States as Nations:  Dig-
nity in Cross-Doctrinal Perspective, 89 VA. L. REV. 1, 10, 51, 106-07 (2003) (claiming that 
the Court’s state dignity jurisprudence maintains an “implicit reliance” on the doctrine 
of foreign state sovereign immunity and contending that the Court should make this 
reliance explicit).  Notable exceptions, though, do exist.  See Gewirth, supra note 14, at 
10, 28 (examining whether there is a right to dignity in the United States); Reva B. 
Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:  Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 
YALE L.J. 1694, 1702 (2008) (illustrating the ways in which dignity “bridges communi-
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marily written by philosophers and theologians, who discuss dignity as 
a moral value divorced from legal application,33 or by international 
and comparative law scholars, who examine dignity’s role in human 
rights declarations and in foreign laws.34
This Article has two related ambitions, both directed at clarifying 
the conceptual chaos surrounding dignity’s complicated usage.  The 
first goal is to provide an approach that captures the range of ways in 
  The prominence of dignity 
in American constitutional law has gone largely unanalyzed.  This 
leaves us without a comprehensive understanding of why the Court 
has embraced dignity, what types of actions threaten dignity, and how 
the Court weighs dignity in relation to other values.  Most importantly, 
we lack a systematic account of dignity’s varied meanings against 
which to ponder these questions. 
 
ties” divided by the abortion debate); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation:  The Vi-
sibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1612-14 (2010) (defending group defamation 
laws for the role they play in affirming the equal dignity of persons); Jeremy Waldron, 
Dignity, Rank, and Rights 10-12, 22-29 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law, Pub. Law & Legal Theory 
Research Paper Series Working Paper No. 09-50, 2009), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461220# [hereinafter Waldron, Dignity, Rank, 
and Rights] (presenting a conception of dignity that views all humans as possessing 
high status in relation to law).  
33
Over the years, philosophers have extensively examined dignity in this context.  
See generally THOMAS E. HILL, JR., DIGNITY AND PRACTICAL REASON IN KANT’S MORAL 
THEORY (1992); Aurel Kolnai, Dignity, 51 PHILOSOPHY 251 (1976) (Eng.); Michael J. 
Meyer, Dignity, Rights, and Self-Control, 99 ETHICS 520 (1989); Michael J. Meyer, Kant’s 
Concept of Dignity and Modern Political Thought, 8 HIST. EUR. IDEAS 319 (1987); Michael 
S. Pritchard, Human Dignity and Justice, 82 ETHICS 299 (1972); Herbert Spiegelberg, 
Human Dignity:  A Challenge to Contemporary Philosophy, 9 PHIL. F. 39 (1971); Gloria 
Zúñiga, An Ontology of Dignity, 5 METAPHYSICA 115 (2004). 
 Theologians have explored the concept of dignity in great depth as well.  See gener-
ally CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ¶¶ 1700-15 (1994); Y. Michael Barilan, From 
Imago Dei in the Jewish-Christian Traditions to Human Dignity in Contemporary Jewish Law, 
19 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 231 (2009); Doron Shultziner, A Jewish Conception of Human 
Dignity:  Philosophy and Its Ethical Implications for Israeli Supreme Court Decisions, 34 J. RE-
LIGIOUS ETHICS 663 (2006); Thomas F. Torrance, The Goodness and Dignity of Man in the 
Christian Tradition, 4 MOD. THEOLOGY 309 (1988). 
34
See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 664-67 (2008) (examining the use of dignity in 
national constitutions, international texts, and the charter of the United Nations); Os-
car Schachter, Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 848, 848-49 
(1983) (identifying where international agreements contain the term dignity); James 
Q. Whitman, “Human Dignity” in Europe and the United States:  The Social Foundations, 25 
HUM. RTS. L.J. 17, 17-23 (2004) (comparing the U.S. conception of human dignity to 
that in Europe primarily through the lens of criminal laws and attributing these vary-
ing conceptions of dignity to Europeans’ emphasis on societal equality); James Q. 
Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy:  Dignity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 
1160-61 (2004) (asserting that the difference between Europe and America’s view of 
privacy is due to the varying emphasis on liberty or dignity). 
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which the Court invokes dignity.  The second is to explore dignity’s 
judicial function in contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. 
Part I of this Article critiques existing theories of dignity and pro-
poses an alternative, Wittgensteinian approach to conceptualizing the 
term.  Standard accounts contend that dignity is either reducible to 
another concept, such as autonomy, or has a core meaning that is ap-
plicable across all contexts.  Although these views are tidy and attractive, 
they tend to draw dignity’s boundaries too narrowly or too broadly. 
This Article argues against a positivistic claim to dignity’s core 
meaning and instead contends that dignity has multiple meanings that, 
in Wittgenstein’s words, share “family resemblances” to each other.35
Part II offers a typology of dignity that explores the compendium 
of pluralistic values that the Court embraces when it speaks of dignity.  
It provides the results of the first study to examine the use of dignity 
in every Supreme Court case from the last 220 years in which the 
word appears in an opinion.
  
While some dignitary harms can be completely described by one type 
of dignity, others admit of complementary meanings.  Because this he-
terodox approach to conceptualizing dignity begins by exploring the 
use of dignity in practice, rather than in the abstract, it maintains a de-
gree of coherence absent from the standard approaches. 
36
Part II proceeds to set forth these conceptions of dignity, which I 
refer to as institutional status as dignity, equality as dignity, liberty as dignity, 
personal integrity as dignity, and collective virtue as dignity.  I first trace each 
conception to its epistemic origins in philosophy, theology, or political 
theory, and articulate its central features.  Then, relying on the Court’s 
opinions, I illustrate that each conception of dignity has a particular 
judicial function oriented toward safeguarding substantive interests 
against dignitary harm.  Teasing out dignity’s different threads per-
mits us to see the work that each conception of dignity is performing 
for the Court.  It also demonstrates why viewing dignity as only a “lib-
eral” or “egalitarian” value is cramped and stultifying.  In contrast, the 
typology I propose provides the tools to evaluate what is normatively 
  This research reveals that while a sin-
gle concept of dignity with fixed boundaries does not exist, five dif-
ferent conceptions of dignity emerge that, although distinct, admit 
of some similarities. 
 
35
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 66 (G.E.M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 1968). 
36
The dataset for this project includes signed and per curiam opinions. 
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and doctrinally at stake in a variety of contexts37
I.  A NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
 and equips us with a 
framework for future discussions. 
This project will raise eyebrows among “dignity skeptics,” those 
who fear the term is useless, and “antidignitarians,” who are certain 
that it is.  They are understandably wary of more “dignity talk.”38  But 
even if they recoiled as former President George W. Bush vaguely re-
ferred to “the non-negotiable demands of human dignity,” in his 
second State of the Union Address,39 or as former President Bill Clin-
ton repeatedly emphasized the universal value of human dignity in his 
weekly radio addresses,40
In the last 220 years, Supreme Court Justices have invoked the 
term in more than nine hundred opinions.
 they cannot claim that the Supreme Court’s 
reliance on dignity is inconsequential. 
41  The Justices issued near-
ly half of these opinions after 1946,42 when the phrase “human digni-
ty” first appeared in an opinion,43
 
37
For example, as discussed in subsection II.A.2, the Court’s increasing use of in-
stitutional status as dignity connects with the expansion of state sovereign immunity 
doctrine.  For a further example, see infra subsection II.E.2, which argues that the 
Court’s recent emphasis in its abortion jurisprudence on collective virtue as dignity—
in lieu of liberty as dignity—signals its growing willingness to take a more normative, 
and less doctrinal, approach to abortion regulation. 
 with more than one hundred opi-
38
Cf. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK:  THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 171-83 (1991) (asserting that the tendency in political debates to frame 
issues in terms of rights diverts political and legal discourse away from meaningful di-
alogue about responsibility and community). 
39
Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 135 (Jan. 29, 2002). 
40
See, e.g., The President’s Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 971 (May 21, 1994) (de-
scribing Social Security as a mechanism for allowing older Americans to “face retire-
ment in old age with dignity”); The President’s Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 569 
(Apr. 2, 1994) (remembering Martin Luther King, Jr. for giving every American the 
“right to live and work in dignity”); The President’s Radio Address, 1 PUB. PAPERS 556 
(Mar. 26, 1994) (“[H]ealth care reform is about . . . bestowing dignity . . . .”); The Pres-
ident’s Radio Address, 2 PUB. PAPERS 2205 (Dec. 25, 1993) (“When we restore dignity 
and security of work for all people, we’ll go a long way toward restoring the fabric of 
life in all our communities.”); The President’s Radio Address, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1348 
(Aug. 7, 1993) (“We want to end welfare . . . [to] restore dignity to millions . . . .”).  
41
At the time of writing, a Westlaw search for “dignity” returned 926 Supreme 
Court cases in which at least one opinion invoked dignity.   
42
At the time of writing, a Westlaw search for “dignity” returned 425 Supreme 
Court cases after 1946 in which at least one opinion invoked dignity. 
43
See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“If we are ever 
to develop an orderly international community based upon a recognition of human dig-
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nions authored in the last twenty years alone.44  As Figure 1 illustrates, 
the percentage of Supreme Court cases that invoke dignity per Term is 
increasing at a statistically significant rate (two-tailed p-value = 0.001), 
and the Roberts Court appears prepared not only to continue, but al-
so to accelerate, this trend.45
 
 
Figure 1:  Percentage of Supreme Court Opinions That Invoke 
Dignity per Court Term46
 
 
Notably, while the use of dignity in dissenting opinions has re-
mained relatively stable during the last sixty-five years (Figure 2), the 
Court’s reliance on dignity in majority opinions is increasing at a sta-






nity it is of the utmost importance that the necessary punishment of those guilty of atroci-
ties be as free as possible from the ugly stigma of revenge and vindictiveness.”).  
44
At the time of writing, a Westlaw search for “dignity” returned 109 Supreme Court 
cases after 1991 in which at least one opinion invoked dignity. 
45
Since Chief Justice Roberts took office in 2005, the Court has issued thirty-four 
opinions that invoke dignity, nearly half of them during the last two Terms alone.  See 
infra Appendix Table 2.   
46
There is a statistically significant, positive relationship between Court Term and 
the percentage of opinions that use dignity (r = 0.40, p = 0.001).  In other words, Court 
Term explains approximately sixteen percent of the variance in the percentage of opi-
nions that use dignity, and an approximately one-in-one-thousand chance exists that 
these results would have been obtained if no relationship between Court Term and use 
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Figure 2:  Percentage of Dissenting Opinions That Invoke  
Dignity per Court Term47
 
 
Figure 3:  Percentage of Majority Opinions That Invoke  





In contrast to Figures 1 and 3, there is not a statistically significant increase in 
the appearance of dignity in the Court’s dissenting opinions (r = 0.10, p = 0.42).  The 
use of dignity in the Court’s dissenting opinions has remained fairly flat during the 
time measured.  The results controlled for the number of cases in which the Court is-
sued an opinion per Term. 
48
There is a statistically significant, positive relationship between Court Term and 
the percentage of majority opinions that use dignity (r = 0.35, p = 0.004).  In other 
words, Court Term explains approximately twelve percent of the variance in the per-
centage of majority opinions that use dignity, and there is less than a four-in-one-
thousand chance that these results would have been obtained if no relationship be-
tween Court Term and use of dignity existed.  The results controlled for the number 
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Although the Court’s frequent invocation of a word does not al-
ways signal increasing jurisprudential reliance on the underlying term, 
I argue that in this instance, the correlation holds.  The Court’s re-
peated appeals to dignity, particularly in majority opinions, appear to 
parallel its greater willingness to proffer dignity as a substantive value 
animating our constitutional rights.  The Court has declared, for ex-
ample, that the “overriding function of the Fourth Amendment is to 
protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by 
the State”;49 that dignity is “the constitutional foundation underlying” 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination;50 that the 
“basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . is nothing less 
than the dignity of man’”;51 and that “choices central to personal dig-
nity and autonomy . . . are central to the liberty protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment.”52
To be sure, dignity skeptics and antidignitarians can claim the 
word is overused and underspecified, but it is a serious mistake to ig-
nore altogether the Court’s increasing reliance on the term, because 




A.  Reductionism and Essentialism:  Deficiencies of the Standard Approach 
  The question, then, is how do we understand the 
Court’s use of dignity?  And to the extent that its view of dignity is in-
tertwined with constitutional rights, what exactly is the Court protect-
ing when it recognizes the value of dignity? 
There have been few attempts to conceptualize dignity, and even 
fewer efforts to do so in the context of American law.54
The reductionists contend that dignity’s features are so well 
aligned with some other concept that dignity is in fact reducible to 
  The theorists 
who have undertaken this task tend to take approaches I describe as 
either reductionist or essentialist. 
 
49
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 
U.S. 757, 767 (1966)). 
50
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
51
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 
100 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
52
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion)). 
53
For example, see infra subsections II.A.2 and II.E.2, which illustrate dignity’s 
role in the evolution of the Court’s sovereign immunity doctrine and abortion juri-
sprudence, respectively.  
54
See supra note 32. 
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that concept.  For example, philosopher Ruth Macklin famously 
claimed that “dignity seems to mean nothing other than respect for 
autonomy.”55  Since autonomy is already a respected societal value, 
Macklin argues that dignity, as used in medical ethics, “can be elimi-
nated without any loss of content.”56  Likewise, psychologist Steven 
Pinker has stated that “[w]hen the concept of dignity is precisely spe-
cified, . . . ultimately it’s just another application of the principle of 
autonomy” because “it amounts to treating people in the way that they 
wish to be treated.”57
Essentialists, by contrast, begin by asking which features of dignity 
differentiate it from other concepts.  They aim to distill dignity’s 
meaning down to its fundamental core by searching for the root or 
basic meaning of dignity.  In this vein, philosopher William Parent has 
argued that the essential value of dignity is “a negative moral right not 
to be regarded or treated with unjust personal disparagement.”
 
58  Si-
milarly, international law scholar Christopher McCrudden has pro-
posed a “minimum core” of dignity, which recognizes that “every hu-
man being possesses an intrinsic worth[,] . . . that this intrinsic worth 
should be recognized and respected by others, and [that] some forms 
of treatment by others are inconsistent with, or required by, respect 
for this intrinsic worth.”59
Though initially appealing for their apparent logic and coheren-
cy, the reductionist and essentialist approaches are problematic.  First, 
they are unable to capture and explain the inconsistencies and 
nuances that pervade our thinking and speaking about dignity.  Con-













Macklin, supra note 28, at 1419.   
56
Id. at 1420. 
57
Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, NEW REPUBLIC, May 28, 2008, at 28, 31. 
58
Parent, supra note 15, at 62. 
59
McCrudden, supra note 34, at 679.   
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Table 1:  Nonlegal Uses of the Term “Dignity” 
  
A Dignity is inherent in every person.60
 A' 
 
Some people are more dignified than others.61
B 
 
Dignity is an inviolable trait that can be affronted, 
but not diminished or destroyed.62
 B' 
 
Some acts can diminish or destroy dignity.63
C 
 
Dignity is a human trait.64
 C' 
 
Dignity is possessed by non-human entities.65
D 
 
Dignity is a matter of self-respect.66
 D' 
 
Dignity is dependent on respect by others.67
 
 
A reductionist view of dignity cannot account for the nuanced ap-
plications of the term.  If dignity is reduced to autonomy, as Macklin 
contends, then the claim that dignity is inherent in all humans (claim 
A) falls flat because some people, such as infants and mentally dis-
abled individuals, do not have rational capacities.68
 
60
See, e.g., Sulmasy, supra note 
  Nor does the re-
30, at 473 (“Intrinsic dignity is the value that human 
beings have simply by virtue of the fact that they are human beings.”). 
61
See, e.g., Holmes Rolston III, Human Uniqueness and Human Dignity:  Persons in 
Nature and the Nature of Persons (noting that dignity is a “relative concept” in that 
“[s]ome behaviors are more dignified than others”), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETH-
ICS, supra note 30, at 129, 147. 
62
See, e.g., Peter Augustine Lawler, Modern and American Dignity (positing that dig-
nity “depends upon natural gifts, gifts that we can misuse or distort but not destroy”), 
in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at 229, 250. 
63
See, e.g., Richard E. Ashcroft, Making Sense of Dignity, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 679, 679 
(2005) (explaining that torture is often designed to destroy a torture victim’s dignity). 
64
See, e.g., Rolston, supra note 61, at 147 (stating that “[a]ll humans have [dignity]”). 
65
Cf. Sara Elizabeth Gavrell Ortiz, Beyond Welfare:  Animal Integrity, Animal Dignity, 
and Genetic Engineering, 9 ETHICS & ENV’T 94, 96 (2004) (acknowledging the argument 
that genetically reducing the capacities of animals infringes upon their dignity). 
66
See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and Political Entitlements (arguing that 
“[h]aving the social bases of self-respect and non-humiliation” are “necessary condi-
tions of a life worthy of human dignity”), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra 
note 30, at 351, 351, 378. 
67
See, e.g., Sulmasy, supra note 30, at 473 (noting that dignity can be conferred 
upon others by placing worth on particular characteristics or attributes).  
68
Similarly, the reductionist view of dignity does not account for why we ascribe dig-
nity to non-human entities, such as redwood trees, that clearly lack rationality (claim C').  
See Nick Bostrom, Dignity and Enhancement (contending that dignity “is not necessarily 
confined to human beings” and sharing a quote from the author John Steinbeck which 
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ductionist approach cohere with our general view that others can di-
minish or destroy a person’s dignity by disrespecting, demeaning, or 
degrading them (claim B'), even if the person does not have the abili-
ty to exercise autonomy.  On the flip side, equating dignity with au-
tonomy does not address situations where individuals make choices 
that demonstrate so little self-respect that we view their conduct as 
undignified (claim D).  Although the reductionist approach correctly 
recognizes that dignity overlaps with particular concepts like autono-
my, it ignores other aspects of the human experience that a richer 
conception of dignity would take into account. 
Insofar as essentialist approaches define dignity by its most basic 
and consistent elements, they too fail to explain its more complicated 
and opposing features.  For example, theories of dignity rooted in the 
intrinsic value of every person (claim A) do not shed light on why so-
ciety considers some people more dignified than others (claim A').  
Nor do these concepts of dignity explain whether disrespectful acts 
are dignity destroying and diminishing (claim B'), or merely dignity 
offending (claim B). 
Second, reductionist and essentialist approaches tend to draw 
dignity’s boundaries either too narrowly or too broadly.  Consider the 
following activities and ideas that the Supreme Court has found to be 
antithetical to, or incompatible with, dignity: 
1.  Subjecting states or state actors to lawsuits by private parties;69
2.  Voting laws that discriminate on the basis of race;
 
70
3.  Content-based restrictions on free speech;
 
71
4.  Regulations that interfere with a woman’s decision to end her  
 
     pregnancy;72
 
captures dignity as an attribute of redwood trees), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, 
supra note 
 
30, at 173, 198. 
69
See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002) (“The 
preeminent purpose of state sovereign immunity is to accord States the dignity that is 
consistent with their status as sovereign entities.”); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 
(1999) (“The generation that designed and adopted our federal system considered 
immunity from private suits central to sovereign dignity.”). 
70
See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000) (“One of the principal reasons 
race is treated as a forbidden classification is because it demeans the dignity and worth 
of a person to be judged by ancestry . . . .”). 
71
See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 
U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (noting that the First Amendment’s approach to protecting 
speech comports “‘with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our 
political system rests’” (quoting Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1991))). 
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5.  Permitting a mentally incapacitated defendant to represent  
     himself at trial;73
6.  Forcefully pumping a person’s stomach to collect evidence of  
 
     illegal drug possession;74
7.  Executing juveniles or people who are mentally incapacitated;
 
75
8.  Partial-birth abortion.
 
76
A reductionist view is too narrow to fully account for the Court’s 
decisions.  For example, if dignity is simply a placeholder for autonomy, 
then we can explain the Court’s use of dignity in cases 3 and 4, and 
partly account for its decision in case 6; however, in the remaining cas-
es, autonomy does not animate the Court’s decision or its use of dignity. 
 
Some essentialist approaches also draw the concept of dignity too 
narrowly.  Even if we generously apply Parent’s view—that people have 
a “right not to be regarded or treated with unjust personal disparage-
ment”77
McCrudden’s “minimum core”
—it does not cover case 1 (which involves the dignity of a non-
human entity), case 3 (which involves the protection of a positive rather 
than a negative right), or case 5 (which involves an individual potential-
ly disparaging himself).  Like Macklin’s concept of dignity, Parent’s view 
of dignity applies only to certain persons or particular problems.  Con-
sequently, some people are prevented from vindicating their dignitary 




See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (describing 
family-planning and child-rearing decisions as “central to personal dignity and auton-
omy” and thus protected under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 suffers from the opposite ail-
ment.  The concept could conceivably encompass all of the cases 
73
See Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (noting that if a defendant 
“who lacks the mental capacity to conduct his defense without the assistance of coun-
sel” is allowed to represent himself, the resulting “spectacle . . . is at least as likely to 
prove humiliating as ennobling” and will not “‘affirm the dignity’” of such a defendant 
(quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984))). 
74
See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (characterizing the forced 
pumping of a person’s stomach as “brutal and . . . offensive to human dignity”). 
75
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560, 578 (2005) (declaring that the execution 
of juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, which “reaffirms the duty of the government 
to respect the dignity of all persons”); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401, 406 (1986) 
(holding that the execution of mentally incapacitated individuals is unconstitutional due 
to the Eighth Amendment’s protection of “fundamental human dignity”). 
76
See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (upholding the Federal Par-
tial-Birth Abortion Ban Act and describing the statute as “express[ing] respect for the 
dignity of human life”). 
77
Parent, supra note 15, at 62. 
78
McCrudden, supra note 34, at 679-80.  
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listed above (with the exception of case 1).  While his work addresses 
the use of dignity in the context of international human rights and 
not American judicial opinions, the notion that dignity is about hu-
mans treating each other in a manner consistent with their intrinsic 
worth could be viewed as protean in any setting.  Without further ex-
plication of what types of treatment violate intrinsic human worth, this 
essentialist conception of dignity does not give sufficient guidance to 
address the complexities of actual cases. 
Standard approaches to conceptualizing dignity may be the very 
reason that dignity skeptics and antidignitarians have long opposed 
the word.  Although reductionist and essentialist conceptions high-
light some aspects of dignity, by suggesting either that dignity is a 
placeholder for other concepts or a discrete and universal value across 
all contexts, these approaches promise too much and deliver too little. 
B.  Reconceptualizing Dignity:  A Wittgensteinian Approach 
Typical approaches to conceptualizing dignity “fall[] short” in 
large part because they are overly bounded.79  They draw clear lines 
around dignity to demonstrate either that it is the same as another 
concept (e.g., autonomy)80 or that it is distinct from all other con-
cepts.81
In contrast to these approaches, I propose a new method of con-
ceptualizing dignity that draws on philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein’s 
view that sharp definitions of words in natural languages often distort 
their meaning.
  In imposing such boundaries, dignity becomes either too ex-
clusive or too inclusive.  The result is that the law either ignores rele-
vant dignitary problems or lacks the specific tools to recognize and 
resolve such problems.  At the very least, the law cannot distinguish 
dignitary concerns from others that touch our humanity. 
82  Wittgenstein rejected the view that a word has an es-
sential, core meaning that applies to all uses of the word.  Instead, he 
claimed that “the meaning of a word is its use in the language,”83
 
79
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 300 (John Weinsheimer & Donald 
G. Marshall trans., Continuum 2d rev. ed. 2004) (1960). 
 not 
an abstract link between the word and what it signifies.  To determine 
80
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.  
81
See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.  
82
Wittgenstein’s linguistic theory differentiates natural languages, like English, 
from purely referential languages, like geometry.  WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 35, ¶ 91.  
In geometry, words can have fixed, core meanings.  A “circle,” for example, is a set of 
co-planar points equidistant from a single point.   
83
Id. ¶ 43. 
HENRY - REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2011  12:17 PM 
2011] Jurisprudence of Dignity 187 
a word’s meaning and function, Wittgenstein famously wrote, 
“[D]on’t think but look!”84
Wittgenstein’s insight occasionally appears in Supreme Court 
opinions.  For example, in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, Justice Frankfur-
ter adopts something like it to reject an essentialist analysis of the sub-
stance/procedure distinction: 
 
Matters of “substance” and matters of “procedure” are much talked about 
in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the 
whole domain of law.  But, of course, “substance” and “procedure” are 
the same keywords to very different problems.  Neither . . . represents the 
same invariants.  Each implies different variables depending upon the 
particular problem for which it is used.  And the different problems are 
only distantly related at best . . . .
85
By and large, however, lawyers tend to be semantic essentialists, 
perhaps because of their early indoctrination into the concept of the 
“elements” (individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions) of 
a crime or tort.  Rejecting semantic essentialism, though, can yield div-
idends even in the law. 
 
Once we abandon the purely referential notion that the meaning 
of a word is fixed and uniform, and turn to its actual use in language, 
we begin to see—as Wittgenstein and Frankfurter did—that the same 
word often has different meanings in different contexts.  Consider the 
word “game,” Wittgenstein’s primary example.  There is not a single 
definition that tells us what counts as a game and what does not.  If you 
consider “board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so 
on . . . you will not see something that is common to all, but similari-
ties, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.”86  Wittgenstein 




Id. ¶ 66. 
  The absence of a single family-defining characteristic does 
not prevent us from observing that family members resemble each 
85
326 U.S. 99, 108 (1945) (citation omitted).  I am grateful to Bill Richman for 
drawing my attention to Justice Frankfurter’s opinion in this case. 
86
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 35, ¶ 66.  There are “many common features,” id., 
between chess and the children’s game “Go Fish”—both involve rules and include an 
element of winning or losing—but there are also key differences.  Chess involves skill; 
“Go Fish” arguably does not.  “Go Fish” is amusing; chess arguably is not.  As my col-
league Max Stearns rightly pointed out to me, one might also consider “game theory,” 
which unlike the other examples, does not include any sense of recreation or fun.  The 
game of “chicken,” for instance, is anxiety provoking and deadly. 
87
Id. ¶ 67. 
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other.88
Wittgenstein’s understanding of language importantly demon-
strates that standard approaches to conceptualizing dignity, which 
search only for its “necessary and sufficient” features, risk distorting or 
circumscribing the word’s meaning.  Rather than seeking exact defini-
tions with clear and rigid boundaries, he implores us to conceptualize 
words by exploring the “overlapping and criss-crossing” meanings they 
have in practice.
  The same is true of words like “game” that operate in a mul-
tiplicity of ways but nevertheless retain a resemblance to each other. 
89
The Supreme Court’s published opinions are a rich resource for 
this enterprise because they document how a politically and religious-
ly diverse group of Justices has invoked dignity in a variety of circums-
tances over time.  The conceptualization of dignity that I set forth is 
the result of examining the various ways in which Supreme Court Jus-
tices have invoked dignity in their opinions, with particular attention 
to the years since 1946, when the word “human dignity” first appeared 
in an opinion.
  To conceptualize dignity, we therefore must ob-
serve how the word is employed in our discourse. 
90
This approach views dignity not as a concept, but as many concep-
tions.  Dignity is not a fixed category, but rather a series of meanings that 
share a Wittgensteinian family resemblance.  The types of dignity I dis-
cerned from examining the Court’s opinions are as distinct as individual 
family members are unique, but like siblings, they have overlapping cha-
racteristics.  In contrast to the standard approach to conceptualizing 
dignity, these types cannot be combined to form a Venn diagram with 
an unchanging central core.  The types are context sensitive, and an 
overlap that appears in one situation may not appear in another. 
  It is attentive to the contexts in which the term has 
arisen and the variety of meanings the Court has ascribed to dignity. 
One can imagine an objection to the proposed approach on the 
grounds that its vision is too contingent to serve as a long-term tem-
 
88
Members of a family may share certain features such as eye color or build, but 
the family is not defined by any single characteristic. 
89
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 35, ¶ 66. 
90
See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 29 (1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting).  The year 1946 
also serves as a useful benchmark because it closely correlates with the end of World 
War II, after which many foreign countries incorporated the word “dignity” into their 
national constitutions, and the United Nations placed respect for human dignity at the 
core of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], May 23, 1949, 
BGBL. I, art. 1(1) (Ger.) (stating that “human dignity shall be inviolable” under Ger-
man law); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating that “[a]ll humans are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights”). 
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plate for addressing dignity issues because it derives dignity’s mean-
ings from experience, context, and usage.  To the contrary, one ad-
vantage of the proposed approach lies in its flexibility.  As law profes-
sor Daniel Solove explains in his ongoing efforts to conceptualize 
privacy, the theory I put forth here 
is but a snapshot of one point in an ongoing evolutionary process.  
Theories are not lifeless pristine abstractions but organic and dynamic 
beings.  They are meant to live, breathe, and grow . . . [as well as] be 
tested, doubted, criticized, amended, supported, and reinterpreted.  
Theories, in short, are not meant to be the final word, but a new chapter 
in an ongoing conversation.
91
A context-driven view of dignity develops with societal change; it 
does not hold society to static meanings, but rather is responsive to 
evolving attitudes, structures, and beliefs.  Moreover, it recognizes that 




Critics also may argue that dignity’s fluidity makes it incoherent; 
that because it applies in multiple contexts to address a plurality of 
problems, it lacks the consistency that makes unified, standard defini-
tions of dignity so attractive.  But traditional approaches to conceptua-
lizing dignity have proven unable to address the distinct but related 
issues that we use dignity to describe.
  Temporal, cultural, political, and technological 
changes can create new dignity issues and even erase old ones.  Digni-
ty, therefore, cannot be defined in a permanent way, but must instead 
remain open to revision. 
93
II.  FIVE CONCEPTIONS OF DIGNITY 
  By jettisoning universal no-
tions of dignity in favor of particularized types, we can speak about 
dignity more clearly.  The proposed typology provides a more cohe-
rent framework against which to contemplate discrete legal issues pre-
cisely because it was created contextually, not abstractly. 
When we move away from a vague notion of dignity and toward 
the more specific contexts in which dignity issues arise, five concep-
tions of dignity appear in the dataset.  I refer to these as institutional 
 
91
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, at ix (2008); see also Danielle Keats 
Citron & Leslie Meltzer Henry, Visionary Pragmatism and the Value of Privacy in the Twen-
ty-First Century, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1107, 1109-10 (2010) (reviewing id.) (embracing So-
love’s pluralistic vision of privacy, rejecting the “quest for a singular essence of privacy” 
as a “dead end,” and suggesting revisions to Solove’s approach). 
92
GADAMER, supra note 79, at 299. 
93
See supra Section I.A. 
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status as dignity, equality as dignity, liberty as dignity, personal integrity as 
dignity, and collective virtue as dignity.  Each type has a distinct epistemic 
story that elucidates its philosophical, religious, or political under-
pinnings.  I connect the origins of each type of dignity to its modern-
day central features and then link each type back to Supreme Court 
opinions that invoke the term. 
In so doing, I suggest that dignity’s primary judicial function is to 
give weight to substantive interests that are implicated in specific con-
texts. For instance, the Court invokes institutional status as dignity to give 
heightened respect to U.S. states in sovereign immunity cases; equality as 
dignity to justify its antidiscrimination jurisprudence; liberty as dignity to 
protect individuals’ personal choices with regard to abortion and same-
sex sodomy; personal integrity as dignity to safeguard people’s reputations 
and bodies from disgraceful or humiliating intrusions; and collective vir-
tue as dignity to advance notions of a decent society in contexts as di-
verse as the death penalty and partial-birth abortion.  As this Part de-
monstrates, each type of dignity is associated with a legal interest the 
Court deems valuable in a plurality of contexts. 
 A.  Institutional Status as Dignity 
1.  Aristocracy and the Recognition of Rank 
It is not coincidental that today the cognate dignitary applies to 
people who hold high-ranking positions in politics, government, and 
the judiciary.  The word “dignity” is derived from the Latin word digni-
tas.94  In ancient Rome, dignitas denoted the honor attached to ele-




4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 656 (2d ed. 1989); see also OXFORD LATIN 
DICTIONARY 542 (1982) (listing related meanings of dignus). 
  The Roman political aristocracy had dignitas, while the 
95
See Teresa Iglesias, Bedrock Truths and the Dignity of the Individual, LOGOS:  J. 
CATHOLIC THOUGHT & CULTURE, Winter 2001, at 114, 120-21 (2001) (“[D]ignitas 
was . . . closely related to the meaning of honor.  Political offices, and as a consequence 
the persons holding them, like that of a senator, or the emperor, had dignitas. . . . The of-
fice or rank . . . carried with [it] the obligation to fulfil the duties proper to the 
rank.”).  Julius Caesar used this notion of dignitas to explain that he partly fought the 
Roman Civil War to restore men to their proper rank and title.  He wrote that he 
aimed “to restore . . . [the] dignity [of] the tribunes,” who were the titular leaders dri-
ven out of Rome during the war.  JULIUS CAESAR, THE CIVIL WAR bk. I, ¶ 22 (J.M. 
Carter ed. & trans., Aris & Phillips 1991) (c. 45 B.C.E.).  
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lower-ranking plebeians did not.96  Similarly, men could possess digni-
tas in ancient Rome, while women could not.97
When “dignity” entered the English language in 1225, it maintained 
its connection to rank and hierarchy, most notably in reference to the 
British monarchy.  Blackstone’s Commentaries explains, for example, that 
because the King is the titular head of state, “it is beneath the dignity of 
the king’s courts to be merely ancillary to other inferior jurisdic-
tions . . . .”
 
98  All criminal offenses in England are “either against the 
king’s peace, or his crown and dignity; and are so laid in every indict-
ment.”99  Blackstone comments that even the “ancient jewels of the 
crown . . . are necessary to . . . support the dignity of the sovereign.”100
From the thirteenth century until the Enlightenment, the predo-
minant view was that dignity is an attribute reserved for high-ranking 
positions and the people who occupy them.
 
101  Kings, bishops, and 
noblemen possessed dignity; commoners did not.102
 
96
Iglesias, supra note 
  As Thomas 
Hobbes wrote in 1651, “the publique worth of a man, which is the 
95, at 120-21.  In ancient Rome, the term dignitas was also 
applied to exemplary poets, orators, and politicians.  See, e.g., 2 QUINTILIAN, INSTI-
TUTES OF THE ORATOR 409 ( J. Patsall trans., B. Law 1774) (c. 95 C.E.) (commenting 
on “the dignity of Messala,” a particularly impressive orator); Cicero, Speech in De-
fence of the Proposed Manilian Law (explaining that Pompeius alone has the dignity 
to be put in supreme command), in ORATIONS 125, 134-50 (Charles Duke Yonge 
trans., New York, Colonial Press rev. ed. 1899). 
97
See CICERO, ON DUTIES bk. I, ¶ 130 (M.T. Griffin & E.M. Atkins eds., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1991) (44 B.C.E.) (“There are two types of beauty:  one includes graceful-
ness, and the other dignity.  We ought to think gracefulness a feminine quality and 
dignity a masculine one.”).  
98
3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *98.  
99
1 id. at *258. 
100
2 id. at *428. 
101
Dictionaries published before the Enlightenment substantiate this usage.  See, 
e.g., NATHAN BAILEY, DICTIONARIUM BRITANNICUM 265 (London, T. Cox 1736) (defin-
ing dignity as “office or employment in church or state”); 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DIC-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Philadelphia, Moses Thomas 1818) (defining 
dignity as “rank of elevation”).  Dignity also was invoked on occasion as a noun to de-
note a public office.  The 1669 Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina state, for exam-
ple, that “[n]o one person shall have more than one dignity,” or public position.  
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTS. OF CAROLINA of 1669, art. XIII, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOR OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED 
STATES OF AMERICA 2772, 2774 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909); see also id. art. IX, 
at 2773 (granting members of parliament “hereditary nobility of the province . . . by 
right of their dignity . . . [as] members”). 
102
See, e.g., EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 60 
(Anchor Books 1973) (1790) (ascribing dignity to the nobility and denying it to the 
common person); JOHNSON, supra note 101 (under “dignitary”) (describing clergymen 
as possessing dignity). 
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Value set on him by the Common-wealth, is that which men common-
ly call DIGNITY.”103
This notion of dignity, which I call institutional status as dignity, has 
several defining characteristics.  As a starting point, it is not intrin-
sic.
  A person’s dignity, or worth, was simply a function 
of social status. 
104
Institutional status as dignity is, by virtue of these defining quali-
ties, both inegalitarian and contingent.  It presupposes, and indeed 
requires, a power differential, which in turn creates an obligation of 
vertical respect.  Institutional status as dignity is therefore “centrally 
an experience of [h]eight.”
  Since it is grounded in, and depends on, the existence of social 
hierarchy, only select individuals or institutions will ever acquire it.  
Nor is institutional status as dignity a permanent trait.  It is held only 
as long as others deem the person or institution worthy of its respect.  
Consequently, this form of dignity can be gained or lost as a person is 
promoted to or demoted from a given position in society. 
105  Those who rank below people and in-
stitutions that have dignity owe them respect, a “bowing gesture” of 
sorts.106  Because people deserve respect only in relation to their varia-
ble dignity or social merit, the respect that dignity garners is contin-
gent, rather than necessary.107
2.  Bestowing Respect on Government and Its Accoutrements 
  Simply stated, not all human beings or 
institutions deserve respect under this framework. 
Historically, the law has reinforced institutional status as dignity, 
taking steps where necessary to protect individuals whose dignity is as-
sociated with elevated political or social rank.108  The Magna Carta, for 
example, exempted earls and barons from being tried by the jury sys-
tem that governed commoners,109
 
103
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 63 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1991) (1651). 
 and the 1689 English Bill of Rights 
104
The case of a hereditary monarchy provides what looks to be an exception 
since the person is born with titular dignity; however, this dignity is not intrinsic to 
their humanity, but rather to their rank. 
105
Kolnai, supra note 33, at 252 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106
Id. (internal quotations marks omitted). 
107
Gewirth, supra note 14, at 17.  This dichotomy is commonly drawn in ethics lite-
rature as well.  See, e.g., Stephen L. Darwall, Two Kinds of Respect, 88 ETHICS 36, 38-39 
(1977) (suggesting that there is a difference between “appraisal respect” and “recogni-
tion respect”). 
108
Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, supra note 32, at 34-35. 
109
MAGNA CARTA ch. 21 (1215), reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS 8, 12 
(Gordon Lloyd & Margie Lloyd eds., 1998). 
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granted special legal respect to the “Crown and royal dignity.”110  The 
early American colonies also took steps in the form of sumptuary laws 
to maintain the divide between those who possessed dignity and those 
who did not.111
When George Washington addressed Congress in 1793, however, 
and suggested that the dignity of the nobility be replaced by the “dig-
nity of the United States,”
 
112 he set the modern-day application of in-
stitutional status as dignity in motion.113  For the last two hundred 
years, the Supreme Court has consistently invoked dignity to protect 
and vindicate the institutional status of governments and their ac-
coutrements.114  Among other functions, the Court has employed dig-
nity to describe the heightened respect owed to judges and cour-
trooms, foreign nations, and American states.115
As anyone who has been to court, or even watched Law and Order 
knows, courtrooms are characterized as hallowed places governed by 
certain formalities, all of which emphasize the court’s authority and the 
respect it commands.  Court sessions generally commence when the 
bailiff says, “All rise for the Honorable . . . .”  The judge then enters the 
room wearing judicial robes and takes his or her seat on an elevated 
platform; the gallery is seated; and the parties’ first words to the court 




An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Suc-
cession of the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1689, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.).  Also, while defama-
tion of a commoner was considered libel or slander under early English law, defama-
tion of a member of the British nobility was punished as scandalum magnatum, both a 
crime and a tort, enforced by the King’s Council.  Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, 
supra note 32, at 34-35. 
111
The General Laws of Massachusetts famously prohibited anyone but large 
landholders from wearing gold, silver, lace, silk, boots, ruffles, capes, or other signifiers 
of high social status.  The General Laws of the Massachusetts Colony, Apparel, at A.51, 
p.5 (1651), reprinted in THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 5 (Boston, Rockwell & 
Churchill City Printers 1887). 
112
George Washington, Fifth Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 3, 1793), in 7 
THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 36, 39 (Jared Sparks ed., Boston, American 
Stationer’s Co. 1837). 
113
Washington’s application of dignity was consistent with its function in the Fe-
deralist Papers, in which every use of the word dignity is tied to the heightened stand-
ing of the government, the nation, or the offices thereof.  Jeremy Rabkin, What We Can 
Learn About Human Dignity from International Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 145, 156 
(2003).  The word dignity, according to Rabkin, appears seventeen times in the Fede-
ralist Papers.  Id.  
114
See infra notes 121-23, 135-49, and accompanying text.   
115
See infra notes 117-53 and accompanying text. 
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the aristocratic tradition of according dignity, and thus deference, to 
high-ranking institutions and officers, finds modern expression.116
When individuals fail to appropriately respect the dignity of the 
proceedings, judges may respond with contempt orders.
 
117  Chief Justice 
Taft explained in Cooke v. United States that “[t]he power of contempt 
which a judge must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly 
administration of justice[,] and in maintaining the authority and digni-
ty of the court[,] is most important and indispensable.”118
 
116
The Supreme Court has also invoked institutional status as dignity to express 
the respect owed to another symbol of democracy, the American flag.  In Texas v. John-
son, the Court declined to condemn the burning of a U.S. flag, instead arguing that its 
dignity was venerated best by permitting individuals to act with the freedom the flag 
symbolizes.  491 U.S. 397, 420 (1989).  As Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, ex-
plained: 
  Throughout 
We can imagine no more appropriate response to burning a flag than waving 
one’s own, no better way to counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting 
the flag that burns, no surer means of preserving the dignity even of the flag 
that burned than by—as one witness here did—according its remains a res-
pectful burial.  We do not consecrate the flag by punishing its desecration, for 
in doing so we dilute the freedom that this cherished emblem represents. 
Id.  As in the judicial contempt cases, the Court’s invocation of dignity in Texas v. John-
son reinforces the typology’s claim that institutional status as dignity is contingent.  The 
flag, like the courtroom, derives its status from the freedom and justice it represents, 
but if those values are undermined, its institutional status as dignity is threatened. 
117
In most cases, contempt orders or the threat thereof give judges sufficient 
power to curb improper courtroom behavior that could unfairly affect the outcome of 
a case.  In rare cases, in which serious misconduct takes place unchecked by the trial 
judge, the Supreme Court has vacated the decision and remanded the case on grounds 
that the proceedings lacked proper dignity.  For a particularly egregious example, see 
Wellons v. Hall, a recent federal habeas case in which the Court vacated the judgment 
below and remanded because, in addition to other potentially improper ex parte ex-
changes between the jurors and the judge, “some jury members gave the trial judge 
chocolate shaped as male genitalia and the bailiff chocolate shaped as female breasts.”  
130 S. Ct. 727, 729, 732 (2010) (per curiam).  Explaining that “judicial proceedings 
conducted for the purpose of deciding whether a defendant shall be put to death must 
be conducted with dignity and respect,” id. at 728, the Court held that the Eleventh 
Circuit should “consider, on the merits, whether petitioner’s allegations, together with 
the undisputed facts, warrant discovery and an evidentiary hearing.”  Id. at 732.  But see, 
e.g., Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 81 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (agreeing 
with the majority holding that buttons displaying a murder victim’s image worn by fam-
ily members during the defendant’s trial were not prejudicial and did not run afoul of 
the “general rule to preserve the calm and dignity of a court”). 
118
267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925); see also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 463-65 
(1971) (citing Cooke approvingly in a case in which the Court contended that a state 
trial judge should have found an individual who had routinely disrupted the cour-
troom with outbursts in contempt of court in the first instance rather than letting the 
defendant’s antics destroy the “fair administration of justice”); United States v. Barnett, 
376 U.S. 681, 696-97 (1964) (“‘It has always been one of the attributes—one of the 
powers necessarily incident to a court of justice—that it should have this power of vin-
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the last century, the Court repeatedly has articulated its view that con-
tempt orders are proper when offense is made “against [a judge’s] dig-
nity and authority.”119  Even when the judge’s dignity is not at issue, the 
Court has upheld contempt orders issued to individuals who engage in 
conduct considered contemptuous, discourteous, or disruptive to the 
dignity of judicial proceedings.120
The Supreme Court also has a long history of employing the lan-
guage of institutional status as dignity to describe the heightened level 
of respect owed to foreign nations.  In the classic 1812 case, The 
Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, the Court considered whether an 
American citizen in an American court could assert title to an armed 
French vessel “found within the waters of the United States.”
 
121  Draw-
ing on principles of the law of nations, Chief Justice Marshall con-
cluded that it would be incompatible with the “dignity” of the foreign 
sovereign to submit to the authority of the United States because 
doing so would undermine the foreign state’s own rank and authori-
ty.122  Since deciding The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court has 
consistently invoked dignity to protect the institutional status of other 
nations in foreign sovereign immunity cases.123
The most noteworthy judicial function of institutional status as 
dignity has been to dramatically expand the doctrine of state sovereign 
immunity.  Institutional status as dignity has long played a part in state 
sovereign immunity cases, as it has in foreign sovereign immunity cas-
es.  But in recent decades the Court has thrust dignity into the spot-
 
 
dicating its dignity, of enforcing its orders, of protecting itself from insult . . . .’” (quot-
ing Eilenbecker v. Dist. Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890))); Sacher v. United States, 343 
U.S. 1, 30 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (contending that Cooke states the proper 
justification for contempt orders). 
119
Sacher, 343 U.S. at 12. 
120
See United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309, 316 n.8 (1975) (“In order to constitute 
an affront to the dignity of the court the judge himself need not be personally insulted.”). 
121
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 135 (1812). 
122
Id. at 137-38; see also Smith, supra note 32, at 39-50 (offering a detailed discus-
sion of dignity in the context of foreign state sovereign immunity). 
123
See, e.g., First Nat’l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 769 
(1972) (plurality opinion) (explaining that after The Schooner Exchange the law “is one of 
implied consent by the territorial sovereign to exempt the foreign sovereign from its 
exclusive and absolute jurisdiction, the implication deriving from standards of public 
morality, fair dealing, reciprocal self-interest, and respect for the power and dignity of 
the foreign sovereign” (quoting Nat’l City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 
(1955))); Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943) (noting that the “judicial 
seizure of a vessel of a friendly foreign state is so serious a challenge to its dignity, and 
may so affect our friendly relations with it, that courts are required to accept and follow 
the executive determination that the vessel is immune”).    
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light and relied on it as the central reason to grant states immunity 
from suit.  The effect has been a considerable expansion of the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity.124
Significantly, the now-dominant view that it is an “indignity” to 
subject “a State to the coercive process of judicial tribunals at the in-
stance of private parties”
 
125
Just five years after the Constitution was ratified, the Court in 
Chisholm v. Georgia considered whether a citizen of one state could 
bring suit against another state in the United States Supreme Court.
 has not always been the Court’s position.  
For the first seventy years of its tenure, the Court held the opposite 
perspective and recognized the superior dignity of the sovereign 
people as the primary reason for allowing citizen suits. 
126  
The plaintiff was a merchant from South Carolina who had entered 
into a contract to purchase war supplies from the State of Georgia.  In 
a 4-1 decision, the Court decided that although a full sovereign nation 
like the United States might enjoy immunity, the same accommoda-
tion was not available to Georgia.127
The opinion is replete with invocations of dignity, almost all of 
which refer to the dignity of the American people, not the dignity of 
the state or nation.
 
128  Expressing his view of popular sovereignty, Jus-
tice Wilson wrote that “[a] State . . . useful and valuable as the contriv-
ance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity 
derives all of its acquired importance.”129  He concluded that because 
“a State . . . [is] subordinate to the people,” it is susceptible to citizen 
suits.130  In agreement, Chief Justice Jay explained that because the 
people established the Constitution “with becoming dignity” and 
“proper sovereignty” that “a State may be sued.”131
 
124
See Smith, supra note 
  In distinguishing 
the American principle of popular sovereignty from the English 
common law, which granted impenetrable power and jurisdiction in 
32, at 28-36 (commenting on the Court’s growing use of the 
concept “dignity of the states” to justify a more robust doctrine of sovereign immunity).  
125
In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887). 
126
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 430-32 (1793). 
127
Id. at 480.  
128
But see id. at 452-53 (opinion of Blair, J.) (noting that it would be “incompatible 
with the dignity of a State” to issue a default judgment against Georgia for its refusal to 
appear in this case).  
129
Id. at 455 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
130
Id. (emphasis omitted). 
131
Id. at 471-73 (opinion of Jay, C.J.). 
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the office of the King,132
States responded to Chisholm with “outrage,” and within a day of 
the Court’s decision, Congress considered the proposal that led to the 
Eleventh Amendment’s adoption.
 the Court in Chisholm firmly rejected the view 
that states have institutional status as dignity. 
133  The Court has subsequently 
demonstrated both in its commentary and through its holdings that 
the decision in Chisholm deviated from the Founders’ view that “im-
munity from private suits [is] central to sovereign dignity.”134
In the past fifteen years, the Court has referred to institutional sta-
tus as dignity as the “‘central,’ ‘preeminent,’ and ‘primary’ justification” 
for expanding states’ immunity from suit.
 
135  In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. 
Florida, 136 the Court overruled its earlier holding in Pennsylvania v. Un-
ion Gas Co., which had acknowledged congressional authority under the 
Commerce Clause to abrogate states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity.137  Explaining that the Eleventh Amendment “serves to avoid 
‘the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of judicial tri-
bunals at the instance of private parties,’”138 the Court in Seminole Tribe 
held that Congress lacks power under Article I to abrogate states’ sove-
reign immunity from suit in federal courts.139
 
132
The opinions of Justices Iredell, Wilson, and Jay go to particular lengths to con-
trast the American and English views of sovereign immunity.  See id. at 443-44, 448 
(opinion of Iredell, J.) (placing the King’s role in determining whether to continue 
proceedings against his sovereign body in contradistinction to that of a state, which 
“derives its authority from . . . [t]he voluntary and deliberate choice of the people” 
(emphasis omitted)); id. at 458 (opinion of Wilson, J.) (echoing Justice Iredell in ex-
plaining that the King obtained sovereignty over everything, but that nothing, in turn, 
had sovereignty over him, while in the United States “the sovereign . . . must be found 
in the man” (emphasis omitted)); id. at 471-72 (opinion of Jay, C.J.) (distinguishing 
between European sovereignties, which were premised on “feudal principles,” and 
American sovereignty, which “devolved on the people” (emphasis omitted)).  
 
133
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 720-21 (1999); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI 
(“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit 
in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”). 
134
Alden, 527 U.S. at 715.  See generally id. at 715-27 (explaining why the Eleventh 
Amendment better reflects the Framers’ intentions with regard to state sovereignty 
than does the decision in Chisholm). 
135
Smith, supra note 32, at 5 (quoting Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 
535 U.S. 743, 760, 765, 769 (2002)). 
136
517 U.S. 44 (1996).  
137
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (plurality opinion), over-
ruled by Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44.   
138
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf 
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993)). 
139
Id. at 72-73.  
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In Alden v. Maine, the Court expanded its jurisprudence to hold 
that Article I legislation cannot abrogate states’ immunity from suit in 
state courts.140  Again invoking the language of dignity to justify its de-
cision, the Court noted that “[t]he generation that designed and 
adopted our federal system considered immunity from private suits 
central to sovereign dignity.”141  Compelling a state to appear in its own 
courts is “offensive” to its stature and “denigrates” its sovereignty.142
The Court’s subsequent decision in Federal Maritime Commission v. 
South Carolina State Ports Authority is arguably its most brazen use of 
dignity in this context.  In concluding that state sovereign immunity 
bars a federal agency from adjudicating a claim against a state, the 




[I]f the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State’s dignity 
to be required to answer the complaints of private parties in federal 
courts, we cannot imagine that they would have found it acceptable to 
compel a State to do exactly the same thing before the administrative 
tribunal of an agency, such as the FMC.  The affront to a State’s dignity 
does not lessen when an adjudication takes place in an administrative 
tribunal as opposed to an Article III court.
  The Court justified its finding as follows: 
144
The Court’s efforts to safeguard states from what seems like disres-
pectful behavior by citizens is further elucidated by the majority’s sug-
gestion that 
 
[o]ne, in fact, could argue that allowing a private party to haul a State in 
front of such an administrative tribunal constitutes a greater insult to a 
State’s dignity than requiring a State to appear in an Article III court 
presided over by a judge with life tenure nominated by the President of 
the United States and confirmed by the United States Senate.
145
Last Term, in Sossamon v. Texas, the Court reaffirmed its reasoning 




527 U.S. 706, 732-33 (1999). 
141
Id. at 715. 
142
Id. at 749. 
143
Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760-61 (2002). 
144
Id. at 760 (citations omitted). 
145
Id. at 760 n.11; cf. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 
1640 (2011) (dismissing as flawed the argument that the state’s dignity would be dimi-
nished if a federal court adjudicated disputes between state components).  In Stewart, 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, distinguished the case from Federal Maritime Com-
mission by explaining that “[d]enial of sovereign immunity . . . offends the dignity of a 
State; but not every offense to the dignity of a State constitutes a denial of sovereign 
immunity.”  Id. at 1640.  
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preclude a lawsuit against a state.146  At issue in Sossamon was whether 
Texas, by accepting federal funds, consented to waive its sovereign 
immunity to suits for money damages under the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.147  Holding that it did not, 
the Court viewed the question as long settled.  Dating back to “the time 
the Constitution was drafted,”148 the Court explained, state sovereign 
immunity doctrine has been “central to sovereign dignity.”149
For many scholars, the reemergence of institutional status as dig-
nity to describe states “as if they were natural persons that could expe-
rience hurt feelings beyond those of their residents”
 
150 is enough to 
“strain[] credulity.”151  The Court’s dissenting Justices would not dis-
agree.  In rejecting the holdings in Seminole Tribe and Alden, Justice 
Stevens and Justice Souter, respectively, called the Court’s reliance on 
dignity “embarrassingly insufficient,”152 and noted that “[w]hatever 
justification there may be for an American government’s immunity 
from private suit, it is not dignity.”153
B.  Equality as Dignity 
  Just how far the Court will go in 
expanding its state sovereign immunity jurisprudence remains to be 
seen, but its increasing reliance on institutional status as dignity to do 
so will be controversial. 
1.  Egalitarianism and Universal Human Worth 
As a theoretical and practical matter, institutional status as dignity 
met its earliest and harshest critics during the Enlightenment.  Pro-
revolutionary activists sought to supplant aristocracy with democracy, 
and a new, more egalitarian dignity surfaced.  Edmund Burke’s view 
that man’s dignity was simply a function of his place in the social hie-
 
146
131 S. Ct. 1651, 1655 (2011). 
147
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to cc-5 (2006). 
148
Sossamon, 131 S. Ct. at 1657. 
149
Id. (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
150
Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term—Foreword:  The Limits of Socratic 
Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 61 (1998). 
151
Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity “Exception,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 
102, 132 (1996). 
152
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 97 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 151 
(1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
153
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 802-03 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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rarchy154 was forcefully countered by Thomas Paine’s call for the rec-
ognition of “the natural dignity of man.”155
In America, this shift coincided with the ratification of the Consti-
tution, which banned titles of nobility.
 
156  Thomas Jefferson held the 
view that “the dignity of man is lost in arbitrary distinctions” based on 
“birth or badge,”157 and Alexander Hamilton agreed, arguing that a 
constitutional democracy was the “safest course for your liberty, your 
dignity, and your happiness.”158  Change was afoot, and the rallying cry 
was one that recognized the equal worth of all human beings.159
Just what characteristics imbued all human beings with dignity was 
less often articulated, but two explanations based on theology and phi-
losophy can be confidently posited.  The Judeo-Christian traditions be-
lieve that the dignity of human beings is derived from their creation in 





See BURKE, supra note 
  While the theological claim has been interpreted 
102, at 60. 
155
THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 41 (Gregory Claeys ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., 
1992) (1791–1792). 
156
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the Unit-
ed States . . . .”); id. art I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . grant any Title of Nobility.”).  
157
Thomas Jefferson, Observations on Démeunier’s Manuscript ( June 22, 1786), 
reprinted in THOMAS JEFFERSON:  WRITINGS 575, 587 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
158
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1, at 14 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).  
Notably, Hamilton was an illegitimate child and may have had a personal stake in 
avoiding titles linked to hereditary status.  See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 
226-27 (2004) (explaining that Hamilton’s illegitimacy may have influenced his views 
on certain political issues, such as a bill that would have in essence forced unwed 
mothers to disclose having an illegitimate child). 
159
However, it should be noted that most calls for equal dignity in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries were not concerned with dignity for all people, but rather 
with dignity for all white men.  As Thurgood Marshall noted,  
For a sense of the evolving nature of the Constitution we need look no further 
than the first three words of the document’s preamble:  “We the People.”  
When the Founding Fathers used this phrase in 1787, they did not have in 
mind the majority of America’s citizens.  “We the People” included, in the 
words of the framers, “the whole Number of free Persons.”  On a matter so ba-
sic as the right to vote, for example, Negro slaves were excluded, although 
they were counted for representational purposes—at three-fifths each. Wom-
en did not gain the right to vote for over a hundred and thirty years.  
Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (footnote omitted) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3); cf. 
MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN ch. IV (Charles W. 
Hagelman, Jr. ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 1967) (1792) (arguing in the eighteenth cen-
tury that women were not simply “a part of man,” but “whole” and rational individuals 
worthy of equal respect). 
160
See Barilan, supra note 33, at 233 (noting the theological view that “all humans 
are equal in terms of their imago Dei,” and thus, dignity).   
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in different ways, the central premise is that humans have a unique 
worth derived from God’s excellence.161  Since all people are made in 
God’s image, “there is no Greek or Jew, circumcised or uncircumcised, 
barbarian, Scythian, slave or free.”162
Philosophical approaches to universal human dignity argue that 
all humans have dignity because they possess a common trait worthy 
of recognition.  The metaphysical conundrum that divides philoso-
phers is determining which human characteristic denotes equal hu-
man dignity.  Philosophers have attempted to ground dignity in what 
some see as humans’ unique ability to reason, experience pain, form 
culture, teach collaboratively, have meaningful life projects, and en-
gage in self-reflection.
  The community under God is not 
divided by differences, but united by its creation in God’s image.  Those 
who deny God’s existence, or who otherwise reject the creation story, 
will not find this view of dignity’s origins plausible and may opt to 
anchor human dignity in a philosophical theory. 
163  The challenge posed by pinning dignity to 
any of these qualities, however, is that some humans may not be able 
to express the dignity-denoting trait.  People with severe mental dis-
abilities, for example, may not have the capacity to express most of 
these characteristics, yet we would surely include them in a vision of 
dignity based on universal human worth.164
One response to this problem is to claim that, despite inter- and 
intra-human variability, all humans have dignity because, as a class, 





See Kass, supra note 
  An 
30, at 323-24 (explaining that “[h]uman life is to be res-
pected more than animal life . . . because man is more than an animal; man is said to 
be god-like”). 
162
Colossians 3:11 (New International).  
163
For a discussion of which distinctively human characteristics might be consi-
dered dignity denoting, see Rolston, supra note 61, at 129-50.  Rolston also discusses 
the possibility, strengthened by advances in evolutionary biology, that some primates 
may have characteristics traditionally understood as human characteristics.  Id. at 131. 
164
If we place those humans who do not have the particular quality that defines 
one as a dignity-bearer outside of the moral community, the result would be an inegali-
tarian view of human dignity that is inconsistent with equality as dignity. 
165
Importantly, the theological and philosophical approaches share an evolutio-
nary outlook.  They understand humans as the highest life form, either as God’s cho-
sen creatures or as creatures with characteristics superior to plants and other animals.  
Notably, this form of dignity as equality is for humans only; by its very definition, it 
renders non-humans inferior.  For this reason, well-known philosopher and animal 
rights activist Peter Singer has claimed that the idea of according special dignity to 
humans is “speciesist” because it discriminates on the basis of whether a being belongs 
to a certain species.  PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION:  A NEW ETHICS FOR OUR 
TREATMENT OF ANIMALS 7-10 (1975).  For a different, but related perspective, see Wal-
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alternative response is to argue that “the trait by virtue of which hu-
mans deserve moral respect is the trait of being human, nothing more 
and nothing less.”166  In this view, all people equally possess dignity be-
cause they are representatives of humanity.167
Though they differ in significant ways, both the theological and phi-
losophical explanations contribute to a better understanding of what I 




dron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights, supra note 
  This type of dignity is defined by three central 
elements.  First, dignity is universal.  It is an intrinsic quality of all hu-
man beings, bestowed upon individuals not by social rank, but simply by 
nature of being human.  Human existence, whether derived from 
God’s image or as an icon of humanity, confers dignity.  Second, dignity 
is permanent.  Unlike institutional status as dignity, equality as dignity 
does not wax and wane, but instead remains constant.  Third, as a con-
sequence of these two features, dignity functions as a horizontal and re-
lational value.  Guided by the idea of reciprocity, all humans owe re-
32, at 26-29, which hypothesizes that our so-
ciety has evolved by transferring the dignity and respect once accorded only to nobility 
downwards to every human being. 
166
Avishai Margalit, Human Dignity Between Kitsch and Deification, HEDGEHOG REV., 
Fall 2007, at 7, 17.  
167
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights seemingly articu-
lates this perspective.  Historical accounts of the Declaration’s drafting suggest that 
while the relevant delegates all agreed that equal human dignity was important, they 
disagreed as to what substantively made such equality paramount.  See MARY ANN 
GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW:  ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARA-
TION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 226 (2001) (observing that “there was remarkably little disa-
greement regarding [the Declaration’s] substance, despite intense wrangling over 
some specifics”).  Their agreement—that all humans possess dignity, without further 
philosophical or theological explanation—exemplifies what Cass Sunstein calls an “in-
completely theorized agreement.”  Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735-36 (1995); see also Paul Weithman, Two Arguments from 
Human Dignity (positing that “the fact that the notion of human dignity is at home in a 
number of moral traditions makes it an especially useful ‘second-level concept,’” in 
that it serves to express “moral agreement among those who may differ about what 
first-order ethical vocabulary best explains why human beings merit respect”), in HU-
MAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, supra note 30, at 435, 437. 
168
The German word menschenwürde comes closest to referring to the kind of dig-
nity that all humans inherently possess because they are human.  See generally Dieter 
Birnbacher, Ambiguities in the Concept of Menschenwürde (“To respect Menschenwürde 
means to respect certain minimal rights owned by its bearer irrespective of considera-
tions of achievement, merit and quality and owned even by those who themselves do 
not respect these minimal rights in others.”), in SANCTITY OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
110, 110 (Kurt Bayertz ed., 1996); Damian P. Fedoryka, The Ontological and Existential 
Dimensions of Human Dignity (characterizing ontological dignity as “dynamic,” rather 
than “static,” and claiming that this dignity can only be “actualized” by “a free, con-
scious and personal act”), in MENSCHENWÜRDE:  METAPHYSIK UND ETHIK 119, 141 (Ma-
riano Crespo ed., 1998). 
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spect to, and deserve respect from, each other as beings of equal worth. 
Whether young or old, sinner or saint, mentally high-performing or 
mentally disabled, each person deserves the same basic respect. 
2.  Shielding People from Unequal Treatment 
In the 1940s, the Supreme Court’s use of dignity began to shift 
from its nearly exclusive focus on institutional status as dignity to a 
broader vision that included personal and collective types of dignity.169  
The Civil Rights Era further cemented this change by focusing the 
Court’s attention on equality as dignity in antidiscrimination cases.  
Today, the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence continues to rely 
on equality as dignity to give substance to its egalitarian mandate.170
The first Civil Rights Era case in which the Court employed equal-
ity as dignity was Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States.
 
171  The case 
involved a motel operator who violated Title II of the Civil Rights Act 




This change coincided with the end of World War II, which prompted several 
nations that had committed wartime atrocities to incorporate respect for human digni-
ty into their constitutions.  See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUT-
SCHLAND [GRUNDGESETZ] [GG] [BASIC LAW], art. 1(1) (stating that “human dignity 
shall be inviolable” under German law).  It also overlapped chronologically with the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which gave a central place to 
the equal dignity of human beings.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. 
Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III), art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating that “[a]ll 
humans are born free and equal in dignity and rights”).  Although one can only specu-
late that these events prompted the Court to pay greater attention to individual and 
collective dignity, its shift in that direction is unmistakable.  For a more detailed dis-
cussion of the incorporation of dignity into foreign constitutions and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, see McCrudden, supra note 
  In rejecting the motel operator’s constitutional challenge to 
the Act’s public accommodations provision, the Court noted that the 
purpose of the Act was to “vindicate the deprivation of personal digni-
ty that surely accompanies denials of equal access to public establish-
34, at 664-67.   
170
Cf. Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 776-81 
(2011) (exploring the evolving role of “liberty-based dignity” in equal protection law).  
In rare instances, the Court has also invoked equality as dignity outside of the equal 
protection doctrine.  See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (mod-
ifying the traditional spousal privilege rule, which did not allow women a choice in tes-
tifying, because “[t]he ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since 
disappeared.  Nowhere in the common-law world—indeed in any modern society—is a 
woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and the 
dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being.”). 
171
379 U.S. 241 (1964). 
172
Id. at 243-44. 
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ments.”173  In upholding Congress’s power to prohibit racial discrimi-
nation in interstate commerce, the Court accepted the view that ex-
clusion from public accommodations on the basis of race denies indi-
viduals the equal dignity and respect they merit as human beings.174
The Court repeated this language in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 
a case upholding a Minnesota statute that prohibited gender discrim-
ination in public accommodations.
 
175  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Brennan explained that gender discrimination similarly “deprives per-
sons of their individual dignity,” as it is an injury that “is surely felt as 
strongly by persons suffering discrimination on the basis of their sex 
as by those treated differently because of their race.”176  Following 
Heart of Atlanta, the Court recognized that people suffer dignitary 
harms when they are categorized in a manner that ignores their 
shared equality as dignity with others.177
More recently, the Court has extended its use of equality as digni-
ty to prohibit jury selection based on race or gender.  In Powers v. 
Ohio, the Court considered whether a prosecutor’s use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude otherwise qualified jurors on the basis of race 
violated the Equal Protection Clause and concluded that “racial dis-
crimination in the qualification or selection of jurors offends the dig-





Id. at 250 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  The Court warned 
that by actively engaging in racial discrimination, the prosecutor’s be-
174
Id. at 257. 
175
468 U.S. 609, 623-29 (1984). 
176
Id. at 625. 
177
Id.  The Court reiterated the nature of this harm in Rice v. Cayetano, which in-
volved a Hawaiian citizen who challenged a statute that barred him from voting be-
cause he was neither a “native Hawaiian[]” nor a descendant of inhabitants of the Ha-
waiian Islands.  528 U.S. 495, 499 (2000).  In holding that the statute violated the 
Fifteenth Amendment because it used ancestry as a proxy for race, the Court ex-
plained that “[o]ne of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden classification 
is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to be judged by ancestry instead of 
by his or her own merit and essential qualities.”  Id. at 517.  Chief Justice Roberts fur-
ther emphasized this point in the recent plurality decision in Parents Involved in Com-
munity Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 when he explained that racial classifications 
in schools are particularly demeaning to individual dignity.  551 U.S. 701, 746-47 
(2007) (plurality opinion); see also id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[A] state-
mandated racial label is inconsistent with the dignity of individuals in our society.”). 
178
499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991); accord Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 44 (1992) 
(“For more than a century, this Court consistently and repeatedly has reaffirmed that 
racial discrimination by the State in jury selection offends the Equal Protection 
Clause.”); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (“Recogniz-
ing the impropriety of racial bias in the courtroom, we hold that race-based exclusion 
violates the equal protection rights of challenged jurors.”). 
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havior may even cast “doubt upon the credibility or dignity of a wit-
ness” merely because of the color of his or her skin.179
In articulating its use of equality as dignity, the Court rejected the 
suggestion that 
 
no particular stigma or dishonor results if a prosecutor uses the raw fact 
of skin color to determine the objectivity or qualifications of a juror.  We 
do not believe a victim of the classification would endorse this view; the 
assumption that no stigma or dishonor attaches contravenes accepted 
equal protection principles.  Race cannot be a proxy for determining ju-
ror bias or competence.
180
Similar reasoning animated the Court’s decision in J.E.B. v. Ala-
bama ex rel. T.B., in which the Court held that gender, like race, is an 
unconstitutional basis for juror selection.
 
181  Invoking the notion of 
equality as dignity, the Court explained that eliminating jurors solely 
because of their gender “is ‘practically a brand upon them, affixed by 
the law, an assertion of their inferiority.’ . . . It denigrates the dignity 
of the excluded juror, and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of exclu-
sion from political participation.”182  In each of these decisions, the 
Court relied on equality as dignity to direct attention to the nature of 
the harm that marginalized individuals or groups experience as the 
result of differential treatment.183
 
179
Powers, 499 U.S. at 412. 
 
180
Id. at 410. 
181
511 U.S. 127, 130 (1994). 
182
Id. at 142 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)). 
183
The Court has invoked equality as dignity when deciding other cases.  See, e.g., 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918 (1982) (supporting the 
NAACP’s right to a peaceful boycott, even though the targeted white businesses suf-
fered damages, in part because the boycotters were challenging “a political and eco-
nomic system that had denied them the basic rights of dignity and equality that this 
country had fought a Civil War to secure”).  But cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 
(2000) (asserting that “[w]hen the state legislature vests the right to vote for President 
in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one 
source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the 
equal dignity owed to each voter”).  In Bush v. Gore, the Court’s emphasis on dignity is 
not aimed at protecting traditionally marginalized individuals or groups.  Instead, the 
Court is concerned with mathematical, formal equality.  It explained that while states 
need not confer the vote, once they do, they “may not, by later arbitrary and disparate 
treatment, value one person’s vote over that of another.”  Id. at 104-05.  Unlike the in-
dividuals in the antidiscrimination cases, who suffered humiliation and stigmatization, 
the voters at issue in Bush v. Gore may not even have been aware of the disparity. 
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C.  Liberty as Dignity 
1.  Liberalism and Individual Self-Determination 
The notion that humans deserve respect as free, autonomous, so-
vereign, and self-determined agents is so entrenched in American po-
litical liberalism that it appears self-evident.184  Its origins can be traced 
back to ancient Greece and Rome, where the Stoics were among the 
first thinkers to connect humans’ unique capacity for moral reasoning 
with their dignity.185  This view was subsequently taken by Pico della 
Mirandola during the Renaissance186 and John Locke during the En-
lightenment,187 both of whom maintained that human dignity was de-
rived from a natural freedom that should not be infringed without 
appropriate justification.188
The ultimate advocate of the connection between human liberty 




Although liberalism can encompass a variety of positions (e.g., “new,” “old,” 
“revisionist,” “welfare state,” or “social justice” liberalism), see Gerald F. Gaus, The Diver-
sity of Comprehensive Liberalisms, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY 100, 100-14 (Ge-
rald F. Gaus & Chandran Kukathas eds., 2004), it is only relevant for the purposes of 
this Article that liberty is at the crux of all liberal theory.  The central belief that free-
dom is normatively basic and restrictions on freedom therefore require justification is 
found in the work of modern liberal theorists, such as Joel Feinberg and John Rawls, 
and in the work of their predecessors, John Locke and John Stuart Mill.  Compare JOEL 
FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 9 (1984) (noting that “most writers on our subject have 
endorsed a kind of ‘presumption in favor of liberty’” and that “[l]iberty should be the 
norm,” while “coercion always needs some special justification”), and JOHN RAWLS, 
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS 44, 112 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (contending that “basic liberties 
have a special status in view of their priority”), with JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 6 
(Longmans, Green, & Co. 1913) (1859) (“[T]he sole end for which mankind are war-
ranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of 
their number, is self-protection.”), and JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 
287 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1963) (1690) (claiming that “all Men are 
naturally in . . . a State of perfect Freedom” and that they should be able to do whatev-
er they want “within the bounds of the Law of Nature” (emphasis omitted)).   
185
MARVIN PERRY ET AL., WESTERN CIVILIZATION:  IDEAS, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 
112-14 (9th ed. 2009).  
186
See generally Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man (1486) (claim-
ing that man’s dignity resides in his ability to direct his future), reprinted in ON THE DIG-
NITY OF MAN 2, 2-34 (Charles Glenn Wallis et al. eds., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1998) (1965). 
187
See LOCKE, supra note 184, at 287. 
188
The notion that one’s liberty should not be disturbed without proper political 
authority and justification appears in social contract theory as well.  See HOBBES, supra 
note 103, at 145-54 (“It is manifest, that every Subject has Liberty in all those things, 
the right whereof cannot by Covenant be transferred.”); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE 
SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 186-89 (G.D.H. Cole trans., J.M. Dent & Sons 
1973) (1762) (“Each man alienates . . . by the social contract, only such part of his 
powers, goods, and liberty as it is important for the community to control . . . .”). 
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Immanuel Kant, who wrote that “humanity so far as it is capable of 
morality, is the only thing which has dignity.”189  Kant claimed that 
human dignity derives from autonomy190—the distinctively human 
ability to discern the moral law and live by it.191  In his view, people de-
serve respect because their capacity for moral direction makes them 
ends in themselves.192 The well-known Kantian maxim that people 
ought to be treated as ends and not simply as means demonstrates the 
level of respect that Kant believed dignity warranted.  For Kant, digni-
ty generated not only an obligation to respect people’s free will, but 
also the concomitant obligation not to abrogate it by treating them as 
an instrument of another’s free will.193
 
189
IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (1785), re-
printed in THE MORAL LAW 114 (H.J. Paton trans., Routledge Classics 2005) (1948) 
[hereinafter KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS]; see also IMMANUEL 
KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 127 (James Ellington trans., Bobbs-
Merrill Co. 1964) (1797) (stating that “[h]umanity itself is a dignity”). 
  Although Kant’s work contin-
190
Autonomy is derived from the ancient Greek words, auto and nomos, which 
translate respectively to mean “self” and “law.” Autonomy literally means to give the law 
to oneself.   
191
See KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, supra note 189, at 
114-15 (“Autonomy is . . . the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every ra-
tional nature.”).  But cf. B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY 41-55 (Bantam 
Books rev. ed. 1990) (1971) (denying that people have the capacity to be morally re-
sponsible in their decisions and that human action cannot be the basis of human dig-
nity because it is determined by factors beyond individual control). 
192
This justification for liberty can also ground claims for equality.  For example, 
some philosophers argue that Kant’s maxim is as much about equality as liberty by citing 
the fact that Pufendorf’s De Officio influenced Kant.  See, e.g., John Laird, The Ethics of Dig-
nity, 15 PHILOSOPHY 131, 131-32 (1940) (Eng.) (asserting that Kant was “very well ac-
quainted” with Pufendorf and thus likely “influenced” by him).  Pufendorf wrote: 
In the very name of man a certain dignity is felt to lie, so that the ultimate and 
most effective rebuttal of insolence and insults from others is “Look, I am not 
a dog, but a man as well as yourself.”  Human nature therefore belongs equal-
ly to all and no one would or could gladly associate with anyone who does not 
value him as a man as well as himself and a partner in the same nature. 
SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL 
LAW 61 (James Tully ed., Michael Silverthorne trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) 
(1673).  For a modern view of the connection between equality and liberty, see, for 
example, MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE (1999).  Nussbaum contends 
that the “idea of equal worth is connected to an idea of liberty:  to respect the equal 
worth of persons is, among other things, to promote their ability to fashion a life in 
accordance with their own view of what is deepest and most important.”  Id. at 5.  
193
See KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS, supra note 189, at 105 
(“Now I say that man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, 
not merely as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will:  he must in all his actions, 
whether they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the 
same time as an end.”).  Isaiah Berlin’s notion of “positive liberty” is analogous.  He de-
scribes a person’s “wish to be a subject, not an object . . . deciding, not being decided 
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ues to be dissected, contested, and reconfigured by contemporary phi-
losophers,194 he is nevertheless considered by many to be “the father 
of the modern concept of human dignity.”195
Given America’s deeply held values of freedom, individualism, and 
autonomy, it is unsurprising that a type of dignity I call liberty as dignity 
resonates powerfully with the Court.  Unlike equality as dignity, this 
form of dignity is neither intrinsic nor universal.  A person has liberty 
as dignity only insofar as he can make autonomous choices.  Because it 
is capacity driven, dignity of this kind is contingent—one can gain or 
lose it over a lifetime.  For example, young children and mentally in-
capacitated individuals do not qualify for liberty as dignity, but it is not 
foreclosed to them if and when they gain mental competence. 
 
Liberty as dignity commands respect at two levels:  first, respect for 
individual choice, and second, respect for individuals because they 
have the capacity for choice.  These two forms of respect are mutually 
reinforcing.  Since exercising our free will is the mechanism through 
which we express our liberty as dignity, it is especially important that 
we encourage and support autonomous decisions.  At the same time, 
because people have the unique ability to shape their future through 
their actions, they must not be treated strictly as objects of others’ 
needs or desires.  Unlike equality as dignity, liberty as dignity can be 
violated, diminished, or even destroyed by actions that fail to appro-
priately respect human self-determination. 
2.  Securing the Conditions for Self-Realization 
The Court’s application of liberty as dignity appears most promi-
nently in cases involving personal decisions, namely the choice to have 
 
for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a 
thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human rule, that is, of conceiving 
goals and policies of my own and realising them.”  ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF 
LIBERTY (1958), reprinted in LIBERTY 166, 178 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). 
194
Kant’s influence is evident in the work of many of his strongest critics.  See, e.g., 
ROBERT B. PIPPIN, HEGEL’S IDEALISM:  THE SATISFACTIONS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS 16-
24 (1989) (explaining that Hegel’s concerns about Kant’s philosophy shaped Hegel’s 
own account of morality); 1 ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, THE WORLD AS WILL AND REPRE-
SENTATION 415-534 (E.F.J. Payne trans., Dover Publ’ns 1966) (1958) (rejecting rationa-
listic, Kantian conceptions of the world but also acknowledging Kant’s critical contri-
butions in this area); Ayn Rand, Brief Summary, OBJECTIVIST, Sept. 1971, at 1, 4 
(opposing Kantian liberalism in favor of her own theory of objectivism). 
195
Giovanni Bognetti, The Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. Constitu-
tionalism, in EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 85, 89 (Georg Nolte ed., 2005).  
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an abortion or engage in same-sex intimacy.196
The Court first invoked the language of liberty as dignity in the 
abortion context in the 1986 case, Thornburgh v. American College of Ob-
stetricians and Gynecologists.
  In these contexts, li-
berty as dignity has played a critical role in securing the choices that 
individuals make to further their identity and personal goals, and it 
appears poised to have an even greater influence in the future. 
197  Thornburgh involved a challenge to certain 
provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act198 that related to 
informed consent, dissemination of material about abortion, physician 
reporting, and post-viability abortions.199  After citing cases where the 
Court had previously cordoned off individual decisions from govern-
ment interference,200
Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, maintained that “[f]ew de-
cisions are more personal and intimate, more properly private, or more 
basic to individual dignity and autonomy, than a woman’s decision . . . 
 the Court placed liberty as dignity at the crux of 
its decision striking down the provisions as unconstitutional. 
 
196
The Court also has invoked liberty as dignity to uphold First Amendment speech 
rights and Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination.  In the 
landmark case Cohen v. California, the Court reasoned that no approach, except free-
dom of speech, “would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon 
which our political system rests.”  403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); see also Simon & Schuster, Inc. 
v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (holding as 
unconstitutional a statute that provided disincentives for particular speech by felons).  
In Stanford v. Texas, the Court stated that the First Amendment, along with the Fourth 
and Fifth, “are indeed closely related, safeguarding not only privacy and protection 
against self-incrimination but conscience and human dignity and freedom of expression 
as well.”  379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965) (quoting Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 376 (1959) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting)); cf. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (restricting 
an incompetent individual’s right to represent himself in court so as to protect his per-
sonal integrity as dignity); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 3, 22-23 (1990) 
(restricting a newspaper’s use of defamatory speech in order to affirm an individual’s 
right to protect his personal integrity as dignity).  For further discussion of the intersec-
tions between dignity and speech rights, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, A Perspective on 
Human Dignity, the First Amendment, and the Right of Publicity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1345, 1350-
55 (2009), and Frederick Schauer, Speaking of Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:  
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES, supra note 13, at 178, 178-91.  
197
476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986), overruled in part by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
198
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3201–3220 (1982), invalidated in part by Thornburgh, 476 
U.S. 747. 
199
Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 750.  
200
See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440, 454-55 (1972) (upholding the 
right of unmarried couples to access contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 485-86 (1965) (prohibiting the state from interfering with married couples’ right 
to use contraception); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923) (recognizing 
the right to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children). 
HENRY - REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2011  12:17 PM 
210 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 169 
whether to end her pregnancy.  A woman’s right to make that choice 
freely is fundamental.”201  In so holding, the Court highlighted that 
“measures seemingly designed to prevent a woman . . . from exercising 
her freedom of choice” were inconsistent with liberty as dignity.202
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, a plurali-
ty of the Court again employed liberty as dignity in the abortion con-
text.
 
203  The constitutionality of provisions of the Pennsylvania Abor-
tion Control Act was again the material issue in Casey.204  As amended 
in 1988 and 1989, the Act, in relevant part, stipulated a twenty-four 
hour waiting period before an abortion procedure, parental consent 
with the option of judicial bypass for minors, spousal notification for 
married women, and physician reporting requirements.205  Unlike in 
Thornburgh, the Court upheld all of the statutory provisions except the 
spousal notification requirement, which violated the Court’s newly 
proffered undue burden standard.206
The plurality was careful to note that although the undue burden 
test was a step away from Roe v. Wade’s framework, the Court’s interest 
in protecting liberty as dignity was unwavering.
 
207  As in Thornburgh, the 
opinion placed abortion on the same legal plane as “personal decisions 
relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education,”208
[t]hese matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a per-
son may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and au-
tonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.  At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of 
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.  
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of person-
hood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
 but then took a significant step in a 
new direction.  In the now famous “mystery of life” passage, Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the controlling plurality, announced that 
209
Just how far the Court is willing to press liberty as dignity to safe-




Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 772. 
202
Id. at 759. 
203
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
204
Id. at 844.  
205
18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203–3220 (1990). 
206
Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-901. 
207
Id. at 874-79.  But see infra notes 302-14 and accompanying text (illustrating 
how this commitment to liberty is shifting in the abortion context). 
208
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851. 
209
Id. 
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opinion in the landmark case Lawrence v. Texas hints at an answer.  In 
a decision invalidating Texas’s antisodomy statute, the Court de-
fended “choices central to personal dignity and autonomy.”210  Writing 
for the majority, Justice Kennedy explained that “adults may choose to 
enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their 
own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. . . . The 
liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice.”211
The most telling use of dignity in Lawrence, however, appears in 
the Court’s recitation of the so-called “mystery of life” passage from 
Casey.  Confirming that “our laws and tradition afford constitutional 
protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education,”
 
212 
the Court went on to restate that substantive due process protects 
“choices central to personal dignity . . . . [such as] the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of 
the mystery of human life.”213
As some commentators have noted in analyzing Lawrence, the 
Court’s use of liberty as dignity takes “the Court further than in any 
previous decision”
 
214 and “may presage a new jurisprudence”215 that 
forbids states from restricting any activity that is “somehow connected 
with efforts ‘to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of 
the universe, and of the mystery of human life.’”216
 
210
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
Although the Court mentions privacy, at least one commentator has claimed that liber-
ty as dignity “is doing all the work.”  Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revo-
lution:  Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21, 34 (2003). 
 
211
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.  Importantly, the Court also invokes personal integri-
ty as dignity in its claims that individuals have a right to be free from the demeaning 
nature of a law that condemns their homosexual activity.  The Court explains that be-
cause the Texas statute required the state to add individuals convicted of same-sex 
sodomy to its registry of sex offenders, it stigmatizes and demeans the very “existence” 
of homosexual individuals.  Id. at 576-78.  Although the Court ultimately grounded its 
decision in liberty as dignity, its awareness of personal integrity as dignity in this con-
text is unmistakable.    
212
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573-74. 
213
Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). 
214
Neomi Rao, On the Use and Abuse of Dignity in Constitutional Law, 14 COLUM. J. 
EUR. L. 201, 241 (2008). 
215
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1583 (2004); see also Yoshino, supra note 170, at 778-81 (arguing 
that the Court’s decision reveals a hybrid liberty-equality claim that may have force in 
future cases). 
216
Lund & McGinnis, supra note 215, at 1583 (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574). 
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If this analysis is correct, then one could imagine the Court revisit-
ing issues like physician-assisted suicide, which it struck down before 
Lawrence under a narrower reading of substantive due process that 
made no normative use of dignity.217  There is surely an argument that 
competent individuals who opt for a physician’s assistance in ending 
their lives are defining their existence and unraveling “the mystery of 
human life.”  While it is unclear whether this position would succeed,218 
Justice Scalia was not understating the case when he observed that the 
Court’s reasoning in Lawrence “will have far-reaching implications.”219
D.  Personal Integrity as Dignity 
 
1.  Aristotelian Virtue and the Dignified, Whole Self 
In a pluralistic, liberal democracy that values equality and liberty 
as dignity, it may seem anachronistic to suggest that humans are more 
or less dignified on the basis of how they conduct themselves and how 
they are treated.  Nevertheless, we say that people who persevere in 
the face of adversity, maintain composure in spite of fear, and display 
self-control despite great suffering are dignified.  In contrast, people 
who become vulnerable to their circumstances, express unharnessed 
appetites, and expose their bodily nakedness or mental fragility are 
undignified.  Most people live at a baseline between the two extremes, 
with few achieving the highest level of human virtue,220
 
217
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-06 (1997) (upholding Wash-
ington State’s statutory prohibition against physician-assisted suicide as constitutional 
under the Fourteenth Amendment).  
 and some fall-
ing intermittently into disrepute. 
218
In Lawrence, the Court appears open to an expansive interpretation of substan-
tive due process:   
[T]hose who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses . . . knew times can 
blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought 
necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.  As the Constitution en-
dures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their own 
search for greater freedom.  
539 U.S. at 578-79.  But see Yale Kamisar, Foreword:  Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence?  
Another Look at the End of Life and Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1466-67 (2008) 
(concluding that the Court is unlikely to overrule Glucksberg because physician-assisted 
suicide, among other things, does not involve a “politically vulnerable group,” nor does 
it have an “emerging [societal] awareness”). 
219
539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
220
As a matter of law, most states do not require individuals to engage in supere-
rogatory behavior.  For example, the vast majority of states do not compel bystanders 
to provide emergency aid to people in need, or even call 911.  See, e.g., MASS. ANN. 
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This modern use of dignity is part of a discourse on excellence 
and virtue that dates back to the ancient philosophers of Greece.  
Aristotle, and the moral theorists before him,221 employed the Greek 
word arête, meaning virtue or excellence, to describe a natural or ar-
tificial object that has become the best example of the thing that it 
is.222  The arête of a knife, for example, is its sharpness; the arête of a 
race horse is its speed.  While human arête could be exemplified by the 
Athenian statesman or the Homeric warrior,223  Aristotle instead un-
derstood that a variety of human characteristics—deliberation, wis-
dom, self-respect, courage, and self-control, among others—could 
make humans fitting, or excellent, examples of their kind.224
Drawing on this view of arête, the Roman philosopher Cicero sub-
sequently adopted the language of dignity to describe the quality of 
achieving human excellence.  In his famous work, De Officiis, Cicero in-
voked the word dignitatem to explain that “[w]e must empty ourselves 
of every agitation of the spirit . . . in order to gain that tranquility of 
spirit . . . which ensures both constancy and standing.”
   
225
 
LAWS ch. 112, § 12B (LexisNexis 2004) (providing legal immunity to physicians, physi-
cian assistants, and nurses who choose to provide emergency medical services); N.Y. 
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3000-a(1) (McKinney 2007) (preventing legal suits against people 
who provide emergency medical services, but not requiring such behavior).  Excep-
tions to that general standard include Minnesota and Vermont, both of which have 
Good Samaritan laws that require any person at the scene of an emergency to provide 
reasonable assistance to another person in need.  See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 
(West 2000) (mandating that people provide “reasonable assistance” to someone who 
“is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm,” so long as the person does not en-
danger himself in the process); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a) (2002) (requiring “rea-
sonable assistance” by a person who is aware that another is in “grave physical danger” 
and who can help without endangering himself).  
  In another 
passage from the same treatise, he employs dignitas to explain that if 
humans “wish to reflect on the excellence and worthiness of our na-
ture, we shall realize how dishonourable it is to sink into luxury and to 
live a soft and effeminate lifestyle, but how honourable to live thriftily, 
221
Socrates, for example, suggests that wisdom is the most important human vir-
tue because it allows man to make the best use of his other assets, such as health, 
wealth, justice, and courage.  2 PLATO, Euthydemus (c. 390 B.C.E.), in LACHES PROTA-
GORAS MENO EUTHYDEMUS 373, 411-13 (W.R.M. Lamb trans., Harvard Univ. Press 
1977). 
222





See generally ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE bks. III-IV, at 
54-115 (R.W. Browne trans., London, George Bell & Sons 1889) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (set-
ting forth the variety of moral virtues).  
225
CICERO, supra note 97, ¶ 69. 
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strictly, with self-restraint, and soberly.”226  Together, these excerpts call 
on humans to express those characteristics befitting the excellence of 
human nature.227
Importantly, Aristotle and his philosophical progeny believed that 
people’s personal circumstances may affect, or even limit, their ability 
to express the dignity associated with human excellence and virtue.  
For instance, to display perseverance, one must face adversity; to ex-
hibit courage, one must confront fear; and to express fortitude, one 
must resist fatigue.
 
228  Conversely, some lives are so dis-integrated that 
individuals do not have the opportunity to exercise or develop the ca-
pacities for human excellence or dignity.229
 
226
Id. ¶ 106. 
  In these latter cases, 
people cannot become virtuous or dignified examples of humanity 
227
A humorous exposition of this use of dignity can be found in the works of the 
ancient Roman dramatist Plautus, who applied this form of dignity in a number of his 
slapstick comedies.  See, e.g., PLAUTUS, Pseudolus (191 B.C.E.) (explaining that it is fit-
ting, “dignum,” to send letters of good wishes to people they befit, “dignis,” but conclud-
ing that because his interlocutor is not worthy, “dignum,” of such a letter, he will not 
bother sending him one), in THE POT OF GOLD AND OTHER PLAYS 217, 255 (E.F. Watl-
ing trans., 1965); PLAUTUS, The Slip-Knot (192 B.C.E.), in THREE PLAYS OF PLAUTUS 51, 
164 (F.A. Wright trans., 1925) (commenting that one character’s form is fitting, “digna 
forma,” of his profession—that he looks like the beggar he is). 
228
Cicero explained that it is “a great and admirable distinction to have borne ad-
versity wisely, not to have been crushed by misfortune, and not to have lost dignity in a 
difficult situation.”  CICERO, DE ORATORE bk. II, ¶¶ 346-47 (H. Rackham ed., E.W. Sut-
ton trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1959) (55 B.C.E.).  Accordingly, actions that are ex-
traordinary in one context may be unremarkable in others.  The fact that Nelson 
Mandela completed his law degree from the University of London while he was a polit-
ical prisoner in South Africa suggests he possesses an extraordinary amount of mental 
strength, courage, and perseverance.  We would not say the same thing about his fel-
low graduates who completed their degrees in residence. 
229
Martha Nussbaum’s excellent work on human capabilities expresses this Aristo-
telian view.  See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE:  DISABILITY, NATIONALI-
TY, SPECIES MEMBERSHIP 159-60 (2006) (describing the capabilities approach to digni-
ty, which “sees rationality and animality as thoroughly unified”); NUSSBAUM, supra note 
192, at 39-47 (exploring the “central human functional capabilities” and contending 
that if a life lacks any of these capabilities that it “will fall short of being a good human 
life” and thus deprive one of his “dignity”); MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HU-
MAN DEVELOPMENT:  THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 70-73 (2000) (“We judge, frequently 
enough, that a life has been so impoverished that it is not worthy of the dignity of the 
human being, that it is a life in which one goes on living, but more or less like an ani-
mal, unable to develop and exercise one’s human powers.”); Nussbaum, supra note 66, 
at 351-80 (describing “ten core capabilities” that “are necessary conditions of a life wor-
thy of human dignity” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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because, to put it in Aristotelian terms, they lack the basic “wholeness” 
that one needs as a baseline from which to excel.230
I refer to the type of dignity that applies both to people who convey 
a constellation of virtuous characteristics and to those who are pre-
vented by circumstance from expressing such characteristics as personal 
integrity as dignity.  This form of dignity has several features. 
 
First, personal integrity as dignity starts with the Aristotelian no-
tion that humans cannot express this form of dignity unless they are 
integrated, whole selves.  I use the word integrity to define this form 
of dignity because it is derived from the Latin word integritas, mean-
ing “wholeness” or “undivided or unbroken state.”231
Second, personal integrity as dignity commands internal and ex-
ternal respect.  It can be destroyed by one’s own actions—as when a 
person acts “beneath his dignity”—or it can be destroyed by the actions 
of others—as when a person is “robbed of his dignity.”  In either sense, 
a person can be rendered undignified by acts that degrade, debase, or 
diminish the individual’s appearance as a collected, unified self. 
  A person who 
has personal integrity as dignity can excel because he is morally, 
mentally, and physically intact, whereas a person who has fallen be-
low a certain human baseline is “in pieces.”  We might colloquially say 
that they have “fallen apart,” “broken down,” or “dis-integrated.” 
Third, the language we use to describe dignified and undignified 
states illustrates that personal integrity as dignity is presentational and 
expressive.  How a person conducts himself publicly matters; whether 
a person speaks, walks, and carries himself with a sense of dignity 
counts.  A slave, who has been deprived of equality and liberty as dig-
nity, can nevertheless possess personal integrity as dignity by express-
ing his sense of moral worth and self-respect in the face of oppression.  
In so doing, the slave is expressing that despite what his owner has 
taken from him, he remains whole, complete, and dignified. 
By contrast, how others treat a person also has expressive implica-
tions for personal integrity as dignity.  Recall the internationally tele-
vised capture of Saddam Hussein by U.S. forces in Iraq.  Stripped of 
his military uniform and subjected to a public delousing, Hussein was 
reduced to a pale specter of his former self.232
 
230
See MICHAEL A. SMITH, HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE COMMON GOOD IN THE ARIS-
TOTELIAN-THOMISTIC TRADITION 6-15 (1995) (describing Aristotle’s theory of the 
“one” or “whole” person). 
  The expressive and 
231
5 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 368 (1961). 
232
See After the Euphoria, ECONOMIST, Dec. 20, 2003, at 79, 79-80 (describing the 
capture of Saddam Hussein and explaining that “[s]ome Iraqis felt that the sight of 
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public function of the televised photos was to demonstrate that Amer-
ican military forces had “broken” Hussein.  They had destroyed his 
personal integrity as dignity by “dressing him down,” both literally and 
figuratively, and demonstrating that the undignified, debased, and 
degraded sub-human on television no longer posed a world threat. 
Fourth, as the presentational and expressive nature of personal in-
tegrity as dignity suggests, there is often an aesthetic element to this 
form of dignity.  People who appear poised, graceful, polished, and 
stately exude “an air of dignity.”  They can present themselves as a 
strong, unified whole.  By contrast, people who look unsightly, un-
seemly, uncomely, inelegant, disgraceful, or even revolting appear 
undignified.  The latter have lost their self-respect—in many cases, it 
has been taken from them—and they have “fallen apart”233 under 
conditions that are aesthetically unsettling, embarrassing, humiliating, 
shameful, disgraceful, demeaning, and self-destructive.234
2.  Protecting Individuals from Dis-Integration 
 
Personal integrity as dignity can be threatened in two contexts.  
The first circumstance occurs when people are judged on the basis of 
a single, personal trait that others deem inconsistent with human vir-
tue or excellence. The second case arises when people are unable to 
present themselves as composed, dignified, whole selves capable of 
human virtue.  The Supreme Court has invoked personal integrity as 
dignity in both situations to protect individuals from views or activities 
that are damaging to the integrated self. 
 
Saddam looking so unkempt and submissive made those who cowered in his shadow 
seem slightly pathetic”).     
233
Pritchard, supra note 33, at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Pritchard 
explains that “whether one can ‘hold himself together’” is central to the notion of per-
sonal integrity.  Id. 
234
Shaming and humiliation occur in a variety of settings and create negative ex-
ternalities.  See, e.g., MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY:  DISGUST, SHAME, 
AND THE LAW 172-221 (2004) (criticizing the use of stigmatization, shame, and humili-
ation as a cure for criminal wrongdoing and perceived social degeneracy); DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION:  GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET 
76-102 (2007) (demonstrating the individual and social costs of unconstrained gossip, 
slander, and rumor in cyberspace); Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really Wrong with Shaming 
Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2075-76 (2006) (concluding that shaming punishments 
are not acceptable to a significant segment of society and therefore recanting his pre-
vious argument that shaming sanctions are expressively equal to imprisonment). 
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a.  When the Self Is Reduced to a Single Trait 
Society frequently judges people on the basis of one particular 
characteristic.  In some cases, attention is drawn to a trait because pos-
sessing it is what makes someone a particularly virtuous or excellent 
(arête) example of that which they do.235
The Court has relied on personal integrity as dignity to describe and 
prevent the harm that results when a personal trait of this kind is thrust 
into the public arena, causing all other personal features to fade into the 
background.  Examples can be found in the Court’s First Amendment 
defamation and Sixth Amendment self-representation cases. 
  For example, an opera singer 
is commended for a strong voice, a surgeon for steady hands, and a 
ballet dancer for graceful feet.  In other cases, a particular characteris-
tic is singled out to suggest that people who possess it are not, or can-
not become, exemplars of humanity.  Society frequently characterizes 
alcoholics, drug addicts, and thieves, for instance, on the basis of a 
trait that others believe prevents them from achieving human excel-
lence.  The defining trait or characteristic is considered so shameful as 
to disqualify the people who possess or express it from a trajectory of 
human excellence or virtue. 
In defamation suits, the Court has opined that when one alleged 
negative fact about a person (whether true or false) becomes all that a 
person’s social group sees and knows of that person, his personal integri-
ty as dignity is at risk.  In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Court ex-
plored whether a newspaper article, which implied that the petitioner 
had lied under oath during a judicial proceeding, was constitutionally 
protected speech.236  The article, in relevant part, suggested that Milko-
vich, a high-school wrestling coach, had knowingly committed perjury 
during a hearing to investigate an altercation between his team and a 
team from another high school that resulted in injuries to several 
people.237  Milkovich maintained that the attack on his veracity damaged 
his reputation and his lifetime occupation as a coach and teacher.238
Although the Court had previously recognized the First Amend-
ment’s “vital guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public 





It is not accidental that we refer to people who are technically gifted in the fine 
arts as virtuosos. 
 it chose instead to rec-
236
497 U.S. 1, 3 (1990). 
237
Id. at 3-5. 
238
Id. at 6-7. 
239
Id. at 22; cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (rejecting the notion 
that the petitioner’s decision to display a vulgar four-letter word on his jacket 
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ognize another side to the equation; namely, a strong interest in pro-
tecting people against affronts to their personal integrity as dignity.  
Quoting an earlier opinion by Justice Stewart, the Court explained 
that “‘[t]he right of a man to the protection of his own reputation 
from unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our 
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human be-
ing.’”240  In restricting the newspaper’s speech, the Court gave greater 
weight to Milkovich’s interest in protecting his personal integrity as 
dignity than the journalist’s or public’s interest in liberty as dignity.241
The Court similarly has invoked personal integrity as dignity to 
prevent an individual from ruining his own reputation.  The decision 
in Indiana v. Edwards is a rare case in which the Court limits individual 
autonomy to protect personal integrity as dignity.
 
242  The case involved 
a mentally ill man who was judged competent to stand trial and who 
invoked his constitutional right to self-representation.243  In a 7-2 deci-
sion, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to self-
representation can be abrogated when exercising that right would not 
“affirm the dignity” of the defendant.244
In the Court’s view, although liberty as dignity underlies the self-
representation right, the “spectacle that could well result from [the 





amounted to “fighting words” likely to incite violence).  In contrast to the Court in 
Milkovich, the majority in Cohen focused on the speaker’s interest in liberty as dignity.  
Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, reasoned that although freedom of expression 
can create “verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance,” there is “no other 
approach [which] would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice 
upon which our political system rests.”  Id. at 24-25. 
  Whether the attack on a person’s repu-
tation is external (as in Milkovich) or inadvertently internal (as in Ed-
wards), the Court’s opinions suggest that when a single negative 
attribute is permitted to overshadow an entire persona, personal inte-
grity as dignity is diminished. 
240
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 22 (emphasis added) (quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 
U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 
241
Cf. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21 (noting that a decision to close off discourse to pre-
vent others from hearing it requires a showing of intolerable invasion of substantial 
privacy interests). 
242
554 U.S. 164, 176 (2008). 
243
Id. at 167. 
244
Id. at 176 (quoting McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176-77 (1984)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
245
Id. 
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b.  When the Self Cannot Express Its Wholeness 
Members of the Court also have invoked personal integrity as dig-
nity to describe situations in which a person is only able to present 
himself as a part of his full self, rather than a unified, composed, or 
collected whole.  Justice Scalia proffers such a notion of personal in-
tegrity as dignity four times in his dissenting opinion in National Trea-
sury Employees Union v. Von Raab.246  In Von Raab, the Court held that 
the U.S. Customs Service’s drug-screening program, which compelled 
employees to submit to urinalysis, was reasonable as applied to certain 
employees because the testing furthered a compelling government in-
terest in safeguarding the nation’s borders.247
Rejecting the Court’s reasoning, Justice Scalia asserted that de-
manding an employee “perform ‘an excretory function traditionally 
shielded by great privacy,’”
 
248 “while ‘a monitor of the same sex . . . 
remains close at hand to listen for the normal sounds’”249 is “offensive 
to personal dignity.”250  What makes it an “affront to [the employees’] 
dignity”251 is not just that the drug test is involuntary, but that it is in-
trusive, embarrassing, and undignified.252  Justice Scalia depicted the 
drug testing in this way to illustrate that it is an “immolation of . . . 
human dignity”253 tied to the “coarsening of our national manners”254
The idea that personal integrity as dignity is implicated when the 
state observes individuals engaged in less-than-savory activities before 
 
and our failure to respect people’s desire to present themselves as 
dignified, composed, and complete. 
 
246
489 U.S. 656, 680-81, 686-87 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
247
Id. at 672 (majority opinion). 
248
Id. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 
489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)).  
249




Id. at 686. 
252
Id. at 686-87.  In his dissent in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, a drug-
testing case decided the same day as Von Raab, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Bren-
nan, concluded that compelled drug testing “significantly intrudes on the ‘personal 
privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State’ against which the 
Fourth Amendment protects.”  489 U.S. 602, 644 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966)).  Justice Marshall noted 
that in “[o]ur culture the excretory functions are shielded by more or less absolute 
privacy, so much so that situations in which this privacy is violated are experienced as 
extremely distressing, as detracting from one’s dignity and self esteem.”  Id. at 646 
(quoting Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 487 (1968)). 
253
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
254
Id. at 687. 
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they have a chance to collect themselves is not one held only by Justice 
Scalia.  Writing for the full Court in Hudson v. Michigan, a case involv-
ing the failure of the police to announce adequately their presence 
before conducting a warrantless search,255
[T]he knock-and-announce rule protects those elements of privacy and 
dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance.  It gives residents 
the “opportunity to prepare themselves for” the entry of the police.  
“The brief interlude between announcement and entry with a warrant 
may be the opportunity that an individual has to pull on clothes or get 
out of bed.”  In other words, it assures the opportunity to collect oneself 
before answering the door.
 Justice Scalia explained one 
dignity-related purpose of the knock-and-announce rule: 
256
In Hudson, as in Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Von Raab, the search 
that affronted personal integrity as dignity involved exposing an indi-
vidual to others when he was indecent, improper, undressed, ungrace-
ful, or uncollected—in short, undignified.
 
257
E.  Collective Virtue as Dignity 
  Like circumstances that 
reduce a whole individual to a solitary trait, situations that prevent an 
individual from expressing his wholeness are dis-integrating and func-
tion as an affront to personal integrity as dignity. 
1.  Communitarianism and Humanity’s Excellence 
Thus far we have traced institutional status as dignity to aristocra-
cy, equality as dignity to egalitarianism, liberty as dignity to political 
liberalism, and integrity as dignity to Aristotelian-virtue theory.  The 
final type of dignity, collective virtue as dignity,258
 
255
547 U.S. 586, 588 (2006). 
 finds its roots in com-
munitarianism, but also expresses some elements of other concepts.  
Collective virtue as dignity addresses how members of civilized socie-
256
Id. at 594 (citations omitted) (quoting Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 393 
n.5 (1997)). 
257
Cf. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004) (distinguishing 
searches of vehicles, which do not implicate personal integrity as dignity, from searches 
of individuals, and stating that “the reasons that might support a requirement of some 
level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—dignity and 
privacy interests of the person being searched—simply do not carry over to vehicles”). 
258
Although there is not a single brand of communitarianism, most political phi-
losophers labeled as communitarian thinkers reject the Rawlsian view that the princip-
al purpose of government is to protect individual liberty interests. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. 
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982) (arguing that Rawlsian liberal-
ism is overly individualistic to the detriment of society). 
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ties ought to behave and ought to be treated in order to respect the 
collective dignity of humanity.  It is less concerned with individual 
dignity per se than with how a society values the totality of human life. 
Collective virtue as dignity has several defining characteristics.  
Notably, it extends the Aristotelian notion of personal excellence to 
the human community writ large.  Instead of distinguishing one per-
son from another on the basis of individual virtue, collective virtue as 
dignity refers to the excellence of the human species.  This excellence 
recognizes humans as the best example (arête) of the animal king-
dom.259 Accordingly, collective virtue as dignity is expressed when 
people behave and are treated in ways worthy of humans, not beasts.260
Collective virtue as dignity is therefore both iconographic and ex-
pressive.  Treating a person in a subhuman manner is wrong not only 
for the effect it has on that individual, but also for the consequences it 
has on collective humanity and society.  For example, critics of torture 
seek to prohibit the practice not simply because it violates the auton-
omy of the tortured individuals and subjects them to extreme pain 
and suffering, but also because torture is anathema to civilized socie-
ties bound by law.
  
When society treats people in ways that are in-humane, or when 
people engage in activities that are de -humanizing, collective virtue as 
dignity diminishes. 
261  People ought to rule with laws rather than with 
brutality and savagery unfitting even for beasts.262
 
259
There are a variety of perspectives on what renders humanity unique among 
creatures.  See, e.g., Rolston, supra note 
  Torture, on that 
view, undermines collective virtue as dignity. 
61, at 135 (considering the biological distinc-
tiveness of humans as compared to animals); see also Bostrom, supra note 68 at 196-98 
(discussing human dignity and possible implications of human cloning); Gilbert Mei-
laender, Human Dignity:  Exploring and Explicating the Council’s Vision (stating that digni-
ty characterizes humans as the rational species), in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS, 
supra note 30, at 253, 253. 
260
See, e.g., Leon Kass, Human Dignity (introducing a set of readings highlighting 
the many facets of humanity), in BEING HUMAN:  CORE READINGS IN THE HUMANITIES 
568 (Leon Kass ed., 2004). 
261
Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law:  Jurisprudence for the White House, 105 
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1709-34 (2005). 
262
Several international laws prohibit torture.  See International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.”); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20 
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (requiring states to “ensure that all acts of torture are of-
fences under its criminal law”).  For further discussion of the view that participating in 
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Conversely, when individuals engage in undignified conduct, their 
acts may threaten humanity’s collective virtue as dignity.  Consider the 
famous French dwarf-tossing case.  In that case, the French Conseil 
d’État granted police power to prevent any public activities that failed 
to respect human dignity.  Accordingly, two municipalities banned the 
spectacle of dwarf-tossing in local clubs.263  Manuel Wackenheim, one 
of the dwarfs, challenged the ban by arguing that he freely partici-
pated in the activity, was paid, and that the ban would result in his un-
employment.  The Conseil d’État ruled that using humans as projec-
tiles was degrading to all members of society because it violated an 
overriding sense of human dignity (i.e., collective virtue as dignity).264
As the dwarf-tossing case demonstrates, collective virtue as dignity 
may overcome arguments for autonomy and often serves to constrain 
individual behavior for the good of society.  In a community that be-
lieves prostitution is an affront to women’s collective dignity, it is irre-
levant that individual women find the practice empowering or view it 
as an exercise of their liberty as dignity.  Similarly, “slavery is a wrong 
even if it is not experienced as negative by the slave and even if the 
slave maintains a substantial amount of de facto autonomy” because 
the practice offends collective virtue as dignity.
  
265
Whether we are discussing the legality of torture, dwarf-tossing, or 
prostitution, the community defines collective virtue as dignity.  This 
is consistent with the communitarian view that moral judgment de-
pends on the actual beliefs, practices, and institutions that create 
communities at specific times and places.  Prohibited conduct consi-
dered offensive and degrading in one society might not be in another. 
 
2.  Advancing Notions of a Decent Society 
The Supreme Court invokes collective virtue as dignity to stop or 
limit activities that do not comport with how a decent society should 
respect the dignity of human life.  This approach is evident in the 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which limits the death pe-
nalty to mentally competent adults266
 
torture harms liberal institutions, see David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking 
Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1425-61 (2005), and Waldron, supra note 
 and precludes certain forms of 
261, at 1709-34. 
263





Kent Greenawalt, Dignity and Victimhood, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 779, 781 (2000).  
266
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (setting aside the death sen-
tence of a juvenile under the age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-21 
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punishment,267 and in the Court’s search and seizure decisions, which 
exclude evidentiary material obtained in a manner that would 
“shock[] the conscience.”268
In limiting the reach of the death penalty to mentally competent 
adults, the Court looked beyond its standard tests to conclude that ci-
vilized societies do not execute the mentally insane,
  The Court’s use of collective virtue as 
dignity is also powerfully evident in its recent abortion jurisprudence. 
269 the mentally re-
tarded,270 or juvenile convicts.271  The Court in Ford v. Wainwright con-
sidered whether inflicting the death penalty on a prisoner who is 
mentally insane violates the Eighth Amendment.272  Observing the 
“natural abhorrence civilized societies feel” at executing an insane 
prisoner, as well as the national “intuition that such an execution 
simply offends humanity,” the Court ruled the practice unconstitu-
tional.273  In so holding, the Court aimed “to protect the dignity of so-
ciety itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance.”274
Confronted with the impending execution of a mentally retarded 
prisoner, the Court in Atkins v. Virginia similarly invoked collective vir-
tue as dignity.
 
275  Emphasizing that the Eighth Amendment draws on 
“the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society,’”276 the Court explained that whether the execution of a 
mentally retarded person violates the Amendment “is judged not by 
the standards that prevailed in 1685 when Lord Jeffreys presided over 
the ‘Bloody Assizes’ or when the Bill of Rights was adopted, but rather 
by those that currently prevail.”277
 
(2002) (holding as unconstitutional the execution of mentally retarded prisoners); 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986) (plurality opinion) (finding the ex-
ecution of mentally ill persons unconstitutional). 
  After observing widespread con-
demnation of the practice by state legislatures, the Court held that ex-
267
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002) (stating that if true, petitioner’s 
allegations that he was handcuffed to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun with 
almost no breaks would establish an Eighth Amendment violation). 
268
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). 
269
Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. 
270
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321. 
271
Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.  
272
477 U.S. at 399. 
273
Id. at 409-10. 
274
Id. at 410. 
275
536 U.S. 304. 
276
Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
277
Id. at 311. 
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ecuting mentally retarded prisoners violates the “‘dignity of man’” at 
the root of the Eighth Amendment.278
In Roper v. Simmons, the Court went one step further, asking not 
only whether the execution of juveniles offended national opinion, 
but also whether it faced international condemnation.
 
279  Drawing at-
tention to the fact that the United States was the only country that 
sanctioned the death penalty for juveniles, the Court noted that for-
eign laws confirm the Court’s view that certain acts must be prohi-
bited to “secure individual freedom and preserve human dignity.”280  
These values, the Court explained, “are central to the American expe-
rience and remain essential to our present-day self-definition and na-
tional identity.”281
The Court’s invocation of collective virtue as dignity is not limited to 
its death penalty jurisprudence.  In Hope v. Pelzer, the Court concluded 
that state prison guards violated an inmate’s Eighth Amendment rights 
when they handcuffed him to a hitching post for seven hours in the sun, 
shirtless, and with no access to a bathroom as punishment for disruptive 
conduct.
  To permit states to execute juveniles not only 
would be out of step with international consensus, but also would di-
minish the nation’s collective virtue as dignity. 
282  Describing Hope’s treatment as “antithetical to human dig-
nity”283 and reiterating that the “basic concept underlying the Eighth 
Amendment . . . is nothing less than the dignity of man,”284 the Court 
concluded that modern understandings of collective decency and hu-
man dignity preclude the use of hitching posts.285
As in Atkins and Roper, the Court in Hope examined societal stan-
dards to determine the degree to which the punishment at issue is out 
of sync with “‘contemporary concepts of decency.’”
 
286  Its determina-
tion that “[t]he obvious cruelty inherent in this practice”287
 
278
Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).  
 is imper-
279
543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005). 
280




536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002).  The Court noted in particular that the punishment 
“subjected him to a substantial risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain caused by the 
handcuffs . . . , to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun, to prolonged thirst and 
taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular dis-
comfort and humiliation.”  Id. at 738. 
283
Id. at 745. 
284
Id. at 738 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (plurality opinion)). 
285
Id. at 745-46. 
286
Id. at 742 (quoting Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1306 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
287
Id. at 745.  
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missible “under ‘precepts of civilization which we profess to pos-
sess’”288
Just last Term, the Court used similar reasoning in Brown v. Plata, 
a case involving Eighth Amendment violations suffered by California’s 
prison population as the result of severe and pervasive prison over-
crowding.
 demonstrates that collective virtue as dignity is at the crux of 
the Court’s decision. 
289  The majority, which affirmed the order of a three-judge 
panel directing the Governor to reduce the prison population, did 
not hesitate to call California’s prison conditions “grossly inade-
quate.”290  In describing the constitutional violations suffered by pris-
oners needing mental health treatment, the Court noted that over-
crowding caused California prisoners to have a suicide rate eighty 
percent higher than the national prison population average, and that 
due to bed shortages at least one suicidal prisoner was “held in . . . a 
cage for nearly 24 hours, standing in a pool of his own urine, unres-
ponsive and nearly catatonic.”291
The Court explained that while “prisoners may be deprived of 
rights that are fundamental to liberty,” they nevertheless “retain the 
essence of human dignity inherent in all persons . . . [that] animates 
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pu-
nishment.”
 
292  When a state facility deprives its citizens of basic susten-
ance, be it food or medical care, it acts in a manner “incompatible 




Id. at 742 (quoting Gates, 501 F.2d at 1306).  The Court’s decision relies heavily 
on its earlier opinion in Trop, in which it held that revoking a U.S. soldier’s citizenship 
as punishment for wartime desertion would drastically alter our collective conception 
of appropriate punishment and our collective virtue as dignity.  356 U.S. at 87-88, 103-
04.  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren explained that “[t]he basic concept 
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man.  While the 
State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be ex-
ercised within the limits of civilized standards.”  Id. at 100. 
  The Court’s invocation of collective virtue as dignity reaffirms 
its view in Hope that certain prison conditions violate the Eighth 
289




Id. at 1924.  The Court also highlighted the abysmal medical care in California 
prisons.  In particular, the majority referenced data that, due to inadequate medical 
care and unsafe conditions, a “preventable or possibly preventable death occurred once 
every five to six days” in California prisons between 2006 and 2007. Id. at 1925 n.4. 
292
Id. at 1928. 
293
Id.  
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Amendment because they are inconsistent with how “decent” societies 
treat even their most abhorred members.294
The Court’s reasoning in so-called shock-the-conscience cases illu-
strates its commitment to collective virtue as dignity in yet another 
context.  In Rochin v. California, the Court held a search unconstitu-
tional when police officers directed a physician to forcibly pump a 
suspect’s stomach to collect evidence that the suspect was a narcotics 
dealer who had swallowed his stash to avoid arrest.
 
295  Justice Frankfur-
ter, delivering the Court’s opinion, described the police conduct in 
securing the evidence as “so brutal and so offensive to human digni-
ty”296
some fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism about combat-
ing crime too energetically.  This is conduct that shocks the conscience.  
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open 
his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his sto-
mach’s contents—this course of proceeding by agents of government to 
obtain evidence is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities.
 that it went beyond 
297
At first, Justice Frankfurter appeared primarily concerned with the 
suspect’s liberty as dignity, which police violated when they intruded 
into his home and manipulated his body without his consent.  But this 
gave way to a deeper concern about the implications of the State’s ac-





Justice Ginsburg reiterated this view most recently in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, wherein 
she noted that the harsh custodial conditions in which al-Kidd was kept were “a grim 
reminder of the need to install safeguards against disrespect for human dignity, con-
straints that will control officialdom even in perilous times.”  131 S. Ct. 2074, 2089 
(2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
  As the opinion continues, 
295
342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952). 
296
Id. at 174. 
297
Id. at 172. 
298
In Winston v. Lee, the Court prohibited a search that would have forced a rob-
bery suspect to undergo surgery requiring general anesthesia to remove a bullet that 
might have implicated him in a crime.  470 U.S. 753, 755 (1985).  Writing for the ma-
jority, Justice Brennan noted that “‘[t]he overriding function of the Fourth Amend-
ment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the 
State.’”  Id. at 760 (alteration in original) (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757, 767 (1966)).  In explaining the Court’s position that the suspect’s “dignitary in-
terests in personal privacy and bodily integrity” outweighed the state’s interest in col-
lecting evidence, id. at 761, Justice Brennan wrote that “drug[ing] this citizen . . . with 
narcotics and barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness, and then . . . search[ing] 
beneath his skin for evidence of a crime . . . involves a virtually total divestment of res-
pondent’s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin.”  Id. at 765 (cita-
tions omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  In contrast to Justice Frankfurter’s 
concern in Rochin that the extraction of evidence violated both liberty as dignity and 
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Frankfurter famously said that there is little difference between forc-
ing a confession from a suspect’s lips and forcing evidence from his 
stomach.299  Both methods, he said, are “too close to the rack and the 
screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.”300  In comparing the 
State’s actions to torture, Frankfurter took care to point out that the 
brutality inflicted on Rochin violated “the general requirement that 
States in their prosecutions respect certain decencies of civilized con-
duct.”301
As noted at the outset of this section, however, the Court’s most 
striking use of collective virtue as dignity appears in its recent abortion 
jurisprudence.  In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court considered whether 
the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, which prohibits a certain 
method of performing late-term abortions,
  In short, forcibly pumping Rochin’s stomach, like handcuff-
ing Hope to a hitching post, threatens collective virtue as dignity by 
suggesting that the civility we associate with our society and its mem-
bers is unwarranted. 
302 is constitutional.303  The 
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act on the grounds that it 
shows “respect for the dignity of human life” without unduly burden-
ing a woman’s choice to seek abortion.304  In reaching this decision, 
the Court not only conferred unprecedented influence on collective 
virtue as dignity, but it also employed arguments to negate pregnant 
women’s claims to liberty as dignity, on which prior abortion jurispru-
dence had largely rested.305
En route to its conclusion, the Court detoured through an exten-
sive and graphic depiction of the abortion procedure at issue.  The 
opinion described the procedure both as having “disturbing similarity 
to the killing of a newborn infant”
 
306 and as “gruesome and inhu-
mane.”307
 
collective virtue as dignity, Justice Brennan relies only on liberty as dignity to deem the 
search in Winston unconstitutional. 
  To defend its view that the banned procedure “devalue[s] 
299
Rochin, 342 U.S. at 173.  
300
Id. at 172. 
301
Id. at 173. 
302
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).  The term “partial-birth abortion” is not a medical 
term, but a political one crafted by anti-abortion advocates with the intent to incite 
opposition to abortion generally.  Siegel, supra note 32, at 1707-08.  The medical term 
for the procedure banned by the Act is “intact D&E” or “dilation and extraction.”  
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 137 (2007). 
303
550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007). 
304
Id. at 157. 
305
See supra subsection II.C.2. 
306
Carhart, 550 U.S. at 158 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note (2000)). 
307
Id. at 141 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1531 note). 
HENRY - REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/8/2011  12:17 PM 
228 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 160: 169 
human life,”308 the Court approvingly cited congressional findings that 
“such a brutal and inhumane procedure . . . will further coarsen socie-
ty to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and inno-
cent human life.”309
As in the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Carhart in-
voked collective virtue as dignity to prohibit an activity that it con-
cluded was out of sync with how a decent society demonstrates “re-
spect for the dignity of human life.”
 
310
The Court’s separate discussion of whether pregnant women can 
make rational decisions about abortion only further subordinates the 
value of liberty as dignity.  From the outset, Carhart had a different fo-
cus than the Court’s prior abortion decisions.  References to women 
do not appear until the fourth page of the Carhart opinion,
  Unlike the Casey plurality, the 
Carhart majority did not weigh a woman’s liberty as dignity against the 
state’s interest in respecting potential life to determine whether the 
Act was constitutional.  Instead, the Court embraced a strategy aligned 
with its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to give priority to claims 
grounded in our collective human dignity. 
311 and then 
only as passive actors in medical procedures.  Not until well over ten 
pages into the opinion do women become participants in their medical 
care.312  When the Court does turn to a woman’s decision, it concludes 
(after admitting that it has no reliable data) that women may “come to 
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sus-
tained” and may suffer “severe depression and loss of esteem.”313
In short, Carhart illustrates that liberty as dignity, and the women 
who possess it, are playing an ever smaller role in the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence.  In their place, the Court proffers collective virtue as dig-
nity to vindicate what it views as our decency and humanity.  This shift in 
the Court’s emphasis serves as a reminder that “the content of human 




Id. at 158. 
309




Id. at 135-36. 
312
Id. at 144. 
313
Id. at 159.  As Professor Reva Siegel has powerfully argued in her recent work, 
there are good reasons to question why the Court cites affidavits suggesting that the 
state ought to protect women from making uninformed decisions about abortion, par-
ticularly when those considerations did not weigh into Congress’ decision to enact the 
ban.  Siegel, supra note 32, at 1698-99. 
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conditions, which can evolve and change in the course of history.”314
CONCLUSION 
  
Having a typology of dignity that can track these nuances offers the op-
portunity to better understand the doctrinal changes they produce. 
This typology of dignity is not, to quote Wittgenstein, a “final anal-
ysis of our forms of language.”315
In mapping the terrain of our current dignity discourse, the ty-
pology brings dignity’s judicial functions into greater relief.  It reveals 
the contexts in which the Court employs dignity to protect substantive 
interests, and conversely, highlights the ways in which the Court’s view 
of dignitary harms reshapes certain legal doctrines.  By illustrating 
that a set of pluralistic values often stand behind the Court’s use of 
dignity, it gives coherence to what might otherwise appear to be va-
gue, imprecise, and even ambiguous uses of the word.  Most impor-
tantly, the typology provides us with the tools to evaluate what is at 
stake, normatively and doctrinally, in a variety of contexts; it allows us 
to detect dignity’s role in doctrinally transformative moments; and it 
equips us with a framework for future discussions. 
  In contrast to standard approaches 
to defining dignity, the proposed framework does not offer a core, 
fixed, or lasting concept of the term.  Instead, it utilizes empirical data 
to recognize that dignity’s conceptions and functions are dynamic and 
context-driven.  Understanding how the Court invokes dignity in prac-
tice, rather than in the abstract, serves as the basis of this typology and 
allows it to maintain the flexibility to respond to evolutions and 













Doron Shultziner, Human Dignity—Functions and Meanings, 3 GLOBAL JURIST 
TOPICS 1, 5 (2003). 
315
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 35, ¶ 91. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1a.  Justice Brennan’s Majority Opinions  
Invoking the Word “Dignity”  
 
Date Case Name Citation 
1989 Texas v. Johnson 491 U.S. 397 
1985 Winston v. Lee 470 U.S. 753 
1984 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 468 U.S. 609 
1978 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658 
1977 Califano v. Goldfarb 430 U.S. 199 
1974 Steffel v. Thompson 415 U.S. 452 
1971 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 403 U.S. 29 
1970 Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254 
1966 Schmerber v. California 384 U.S. 757 
1965 Dombrowski v. Pfister 380 U.S. 479 
1964 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan 376 U.S. 254 
1959 Abbate v. United States 359 U.S. 187 
 
Table 1b.  Justice Brennan’s Concurring Opinions  
Invoking the Word “Dignity” 
 
Date Case Name Citation 
1988 City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik 485 U.S. 112 
1987 United States v. Stanley 483 U.S. 669 
1987 Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co. 482 U.S. 656 
1981 Rhodes v. Chapman 452 U.S. 337 
1979 Herbert v. Lando 441 U.S. 153 
1973 Hurtado v. United States 410 U.S. 578 
1972 Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 
1970 Illinois v. Allen 397 U.S. 337 
1963 Ker v. California 374 U.S. 23 
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Table 1c.  Justice Brennan’s Dissenting Opinions  
Invoking the Word “Dignity” 
 
Date Case Name Citation 
1990 Lewis v. Jeffers316 497 U.S. 764  
1990 Walton v. Arizona 497 U.S. 639 
1990 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health 497 U.S. 261 
1989 Stanford v. Kentucky 492 U.S. 361 
1989 Florida v. Riley 488 U.S. 445 
1987 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz 482 U.S. 342 
1986 Colorado v. Connelly 479 U.S. 157 
1986 Goldman v. Weinberger 475 U.S. 503 
1985 United States v. Montoya  
de Hernandez 
473 U.S. 531 
1985 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.  
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 
472 U.S. 749 
1983 Jones v. Barnes 463 U.S. 745 
1976 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S. 543 
1976 Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 227 
1976 Estelle v. Williams 425 U.S. 501 
1976 Paul v. Davis 424 U.S. 693 
1976 Time, Inc. v. Firestone 424 U.S. 448 
1975 United States v. Wilson 421 U.S. 309 









The Supreme Court decided Lewis v. Jeffers and Walton v. Arizona on the same 
day.  While Justice Brennan’s dissent can be found in Walton, it also applies to Lewis.   
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Table 2.  Opinions Invoking the Word “Dignity” During  
the Tenure of the Roberts Court  
 
Date Case Name Citation 
2011 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc. 131 S. Ct. 2653 
2011 Bond v. United States 131 S. Ct. 2355 
2011 Ashcroft v. al-Kidd 131 S. Ct. 2074 
2011 Brown v. Plata 131 S. Ct. 1910 
2011 Sossamon v. Texas 131 S. Ct. 1651 
2011 Va. Office for Prot. &  
Advocacy v. Stewart 
131 S. Ct. 1632 
2010 McDonald v. City of Chicago 130 S. Ct. 3020 
2010 Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter  
of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings  
Coll. of the Law v. Martinez 
130 S. Ct. 2971 
2010 City of Ontario v. Quon 130 S. Ct. 2619 
2010 Barber v. Thomas 130 S. Ct. 2499 
2010 Alabama v. North Carolina 130 S. Ct. 2295 
2010 Samantar v. Yousuf 130 S. Ct. 2278 
2010 Citizens United v. FEC 130 S. Ct. 876 
2010 South Carolina v. North Carolina 130 S. Ct. 854 
2010 Wellons v. Hall 130 S. Ct. 727 
2010 Hollingsworth v. Perry 130 S. Ct. 705 
2009 Beard v. Kindler 130 S. Ct. 612 
2009 Herring v. United States 555 U.S. 135 
2008 Kennedy v. Louisiana 554 U.S. 407 
2008 Plains Commerce Bank v. Long  
Family Land & Cattle Co. 
554 U.S. 316 
2008 Indiana v. Edwards 554 U.S. 164 
2008 Republic of Phil. v. Pimentel 553 U.S. 851 
2008 Virginia v. Moore 553 U.S. 164 
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Date Case Name Citation 
2008 Baze v. Rees 553 U.S. 35 
2007 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 
551 U.S. 701 
2007 Gonzales v. Carhart 550 U.S. 124 
2007 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A. 550 U.S. 1 
2007 Massachusetts v. EPA 549 U.S. 497 
2006 Carey v. Musladin 549 U.S. 70 
2006 Beard v. Banks 548 U.S. 521 
2006 Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of  
Educ. v. Murphy 
548 U.S. 291 
2006 Woodford v. Ngo 548 U.S. 81 
2006 Hudson v. Michigan 547 U.S. 586 
2005 Wagnon v. Prairie Band  
Potawatomi Nation 
546 U.S. 95 
 
 
 
 
 
 
